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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local Union 12457

OPINION and AWARD
Case #84K/15077

and

Allied

Chemical

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance 18-1984 dated January 26th, 1984?
A hearing was held in Solvay, New York on October 11, 1984
at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union gave

an oral summation; the Company filed a post-hearing brief.
Grievance 18-1984 reads:
Protest: On 1-26-84 we the Bottom Kiln
cleaners were told to clean the Elevator
Pit. We feel that utilizing us as cleaners on the days we have a Kiln to clean
is not part of our job description, and
the Company has been treating us unfairly.
In this arbitration the Union also protests similar but
subsequent assignments in the Elevator Pit. Whether those
later work assignments are part of this grievance is immaterial
because I am satisfied that the decision in this case will be
dispositive of all instances in which this dispute substantively
arose.
The question is simply whether the Company had the right
to assign Bottom Kiln cleaners to clean the Elevator Pit, when

-2indisputedly the cleaning of Kiln bottoms is their primary job.
This contractual relationship does not include

traditional

job descriptions of the various job classifications.

Rather,

the jobs are classified for pay purposes, though the primary
duties may be stated.

Coupled with the Management Rights claus

of the contract, which provides in pertinent part:
"The Company shall remain vested with all
management functions ... subject to the...
provisions herein contained,"
the Company would have the right to assign duties to a classification that the employees in those positions have regularly
and traditionally performed as well as other duties for which
the employees are qualified or have the ability to perform and
for which they are properly paido

A more precise

delineation

of duties confined to the classification or, conversely, excluded from the classification, are matters for collective bargaining and for the negotiation and/or promulgation of formal
job descriptions, but not for arbitration.

In short in the

absence of a contract or job description limitation, the Company
has retained the right to determine job content.
Here, however, there has been a modification of the foregoing managerial authority.

It is a limited restriction which th

Company apparently imposed on itself when it established the
Bottom Kiln cleaner position.

In letters dated August 22,

September 10 and September 29, 1975 to the Union, the Company
set forth generally, the primary duties and expected duties of
the Bottom Kiln cleaner0

The last letter in the series, dated

September 29, 1975 (Union Exhibit #6) appears to be the final
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word on those duties or assignments.

In pertinent part it

states:
"These people will be used primarily to
clean Kiln bottoms and will be assigned supplementary work that is presently
performed by Kiln cleaners." (emphasis added)
By that letter, the Company agreed that the primary duty
of the Kiln Cleaner would be to clean Kilns.

Hence, any work

assignment that by type, magnitude or duration pre-empted the
primary duty of Kiln cleaning would be violative of that understanding and hence violative of the contractual relationship.
On the other hand, by including a provision for the
assignment of "supplemental work that is presently being performed by existing Kiln Cleaners" the Company clearly set
forth its intention and right to assign different

incidental

and short term duties to the Bottom Kiln Cleaners in addition
to their primary work of cleaning Kiln bottoms.
Accordingly, the questions in this case are (1) whether
the cleaning of the Elevator Pit pre-empted the primary work
of cleaning Kiln bottoms and (2) whether the Elevator Pit
cleaning was "supplemental work that is presently being performed by Kiln Cleaners" within the meaning of the September
29, 1975 letter.
It is obvious that the first question is to be answered in
the negative.

Under the facts presented, the Elevator Pit work

was only for a matter of hours and thus did not reach a quantity
or duration that would supercede Kiln cleaning.

And I find that

-4to be so regardless of whether at the time the employees were
assigned to the Elevator Pit, there was or was not a Kiln
available to be cleaned.

Pre-emption of the primary duty of

Kiln bottom cleaning would require the replacement of that
work by the cleaning of the Elevator Pit for a regular and extended period of time equal to a majority or at least a
significant part of the work week.

That was not the case in

the instant situation, nor in the subsequent disputed assignment .
The Union's concession that assignment to the Elevator Pit
would not be objectionable if there is no work on Kiln bottoms,
is prejudicial to the Union's position.

The concession means

that there i_s_ a circumstance when assignment to clean the
Elevator Pit would be proper; that cleaning the Elevator Pit
was a task within the ability and qualifications of the Kiln
Cleaners; and that the Elevator Pit work was not unreasonably
related to the primary work of Kiln bottom cleaning.

But, I

find nothing in the record which limits the assignment of
Elevator Pit cleaning to times when there are no Kilns to clean
Nor has it been probatively shown in this record that on
January 26, 1984, there was a Kiln bottom available and ready
to be cleaned.

In short, the circumstance under which the

Union would permit the Kiln cleaners to clean the Elevator Pit
may well have been present at the time this grievance arose.
However that is immaterial, because in the absence of any such

-5restriction, the decision of whether to clean a Kiln bottom
or an Elevator Pit at a particular time remains an exclusive
managerial decision.
The evidence in the record supports an affirmative answer
to the second question.

The Company offered persuasive testi-

mony showing that Kiln cleaners were assigned to clean the
Elevator Pit from time to time for the period at least from
1968 to 1971.

There is no showing that these periodic assign-

ments did not continue into 1975 when the September 29th letter
was written.

Indeed, there is no evidence in the record which

identifies any other work as constituting the ''supplemental
work... presently being performed by existing Kiln cleaners."
So it is logical and reasonable that that phrase written in
1975 meant or at least included cleaning the Elevator Pit.
In the absence of a contract change in point or the
promulgation of job descriptions

which change or more precise-

ly delimit the job duties (and neither have occurred in this
situation), I cannot hold that what the Kiln cleaners were
assigned as "supplemental work" in 1975, was not applicable
and equally assignable

in 1984.

Therefore, assuming arguendo

that there was a hiatus in the assignment of the disputed work
between the mid-1970's and 1984, without any relevant contract
or other binding changes during the period

I cannot construe

any such hiatus as a waiver of the Company's retained right to
renew the assignment to the Elevator Pit as "supplemental work"

-6for the Bottom Kiln cleaners.

Nor do I construe the Company's

contract proposal in 1984 for a "Secondary Skills Utilization
Program" to be evidence of a waiver of that right.

I am

satisfied that the effort to get a "Secondary Skills Utilization Program" was to gain greater flexibility in assigning
employees to primary or regular duties and was not intended to
apply to incidental or supplementary duties.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly hearing the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance 18-1984 dated January
26, 1984 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 24, 1985
STATE OF New York )Q Q *
COUNTY OF New York ) b t > - •
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 140 WEST si STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10020-1203
Phone: (212)484-4000 • Telex: 12463 AMARB

GEORGE H. FRIEDMAN
Director
New York Region

Leea! ISSf Bis trice Ganaell
37, &FSCME, AFL-CIO

1330

Atts ttefeard J. Ferrer 1,
125 Barclay Street
Bttw T«k, lew ferk

37,

16067

1559 Blstrlct Oexmcil
AfL-CIO

of

f ©r

listery

425

Ees T«rain&t;Ioa

Knr- fwrk, lee York

te ttag
J, Ferrer! „

84

& letter dated Htnresiber 26, ISF84
note all t»ter«st«4 fs,rtie» received

the iirbitracor Co advise
of

te tita states ef £his-«atter after fei»

11 Mreets 4
ccs

Miami
Otiices: Atlanta • Boston • Charlotte • Chicago • Cincinnati • Cleveland • Dallas • Denver • Detroit • Garden City, N.Y. • Hartford • Kansas City, Missouri • Los Angeles • Mi
ork • Philadelphia • Phoenix • Pittsburgh • San Diego* San Francisco « Seattle 'Syracuse • Washington, D.C. • White Plains, N.Y.
Minneapolis • New Jersey • New Yor

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees AFL-CIO
125 Barclay Street, New York, N.Y. 10007 • 766-1043

district council
LEGAL DEPAR TMENT
BEVERLY GROSS
General Counsel
ROBERT PEREZ-WILSON
Associate General Counsel

November 26, 1984
Ms. Lenore Kappen
Tribunal Administrator
American Arbitration Association
140 West 51st Street
New York, New York 10020
Re:

AAA-1330-0888-84
(Harry Jacobson and the Museum of Natural
History)

Dear Ms. Kappen:
Please forward this letter to Eric Schmertz, the
designated Arbitrator in the above-captioned matter.
Please take notice that this office is withdrawing as
counsel for Harry Jacobson, the grievant herein, for the
following reasons. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to reach
the grievant by telephone in regard to his failure to comply with
the stipulation of settlement, I wrote to him on three occasions
advising him to contact me immediately to discuss this matter.
To date grievant has not contacted me. These letters, dated
October 18th, October 24th and November 1st, 1984 were sent by
regular mail and apparently received by grievant as they were not
returned to me. The last letter was also sent "certified mail return receipt requested" and was returned to me because the
addressee (grievant) "refused" to accept it. This last letter
informed grievant that his failure to respond to me by November
16th, 1984 would result in this office's withdrawal as his
counsel.
It is clear from the aforementioned conduct of grievant
that he does not wish this office to represent him. Therefore,
this office has no other choice but to withdraw as counsel for
grievant. Any future correspondence from the American
Arbitration Association, the Arbitrator or counsel for the Museum
should be forwarded directly to grievant.

Ms. Lenore Kappen
November 26, 1984
Page Two

Copies of this letter are being sent to grievant by
regular and certified mail.
Very truly

Richard J. Ferreri
Assistant General Counsel

RJF:elL11267
cc:

Harry Jacobson
Raymond Vandenberg, Esq.
Mark Zelek, Esq.
Guido Menta
Tony Griesi
Joseph Barriteau

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration

Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 1559 District Counsel 37,
AFSC&ME, AFL-CIO

CONSENT AWARD
Case #1330 08888 84

and
American Museum of Natural History

The issue is:
Whether Harry Jacobson was terminated in
violation of the contract between the
Union and the Museum?
A hearing was held on September 14, 1984 at which time
Mr. Jacobson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievent" and
representatives of the above named Union and Museum appeared.
At the outset of the hearing, the parties settled the
dispute.

At the request of the Union and the Museum, that

settlement is made a Consent Award, as follows:
1.

The grievant will apply for a disability
pension.

2.

The grievant will cooperate with the medical
personnel he is directed to see by the Museum
or Pension Board.

3.

Whatever medical expenses the grievant incurs
in connection with his application for the disability pension will be borne by the Museum or
Pension Board as appropriate.

4.

If the grievant's application for a disability
pension is denied, the Museum will pay to the
grievant the dollar equivalent of the disability
pension from September 14, 1984 in the amount
of $5460 per year on a monthly basis, up to
and including December 1, 1987 (when he becomes
eligible for early retirement).

-25.

The reasons for the grievant's discharge
on March 27, 1984 shall be expunged from
his personnel record and shall not be disclosed to any source.

6.

The grievant shall receive from the Museum
as part of this settlement the sum of

7.

The grievant shall execute a general release in favor of the Museum and shall
withdraw his complaint before the U. S.
Department of Labor, Division of OSHA
(Case #2-4173-84-27).

8.

Such general release and withdrawal of
case #2-4173-84-27 shall not bar the
grievant from filing a later Workmen's
Compensation claim in regard to a later
discovered occupationally related disease
or disability.

9.

The arbitration case #1330 0888 84 is
withdrawn, except that the Undersigned
retains jurisdiction of this matter for
the interpretation and application of
the foregoing.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 17, 1984
STATE OF New York )Q Q '
COUNTY OF New York ) b & -•
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

s

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Food & Commercial Workers
Local 22, AFL-CIO

OPINION and AWARD
Case No. 84K/01219

and
American Stores Packing Company,
Division of Acme Markets, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Do retiree benefits, other than pension benefits survive the expiration of the contract?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Chicago, Illinois on September 12, 1984
at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
post-hearing briefs.

witnesses.

The Union and Company filed

The Company filed a reply brief.

The benefits which the Union claims continue after the contract expiration are the social security supplemental; prescription benefits; hospital, surgical and medical coverage; and life
insurance.
I have carefully reviewed the cases cited.

It is axiom-

atic that rights and benefits that accrue during the term of a
collective bargaining

agreement may be asserted and enforced,

for that accrued or applicable period, in a proceeding after the
contract expires.

However, I remain persuaded that contract

benefits do not remain prospectively effective or continue in
force after the termination of the contract, unless the contract
expressly provides for said continued effectiveness or survival,
or the contract language is at least ambiguously susceptible to

-2such interpretation or external law so mandates.
In the instant case, the Union has not met the burden of
showing any of the foregoing conditions.
There is no assertion by the Union that there is statutory
or external law mandating the survival of the disputed benefits,
other than pension benefits, for retirees. 2 The contract is
silent on the matter and hence cannot be construed to provide
for survival or prospective effectiveness, even on an ambiguous
basis, and the Retiree Benefit Handbook, incorporated by reference into the contract (and hence an effective part of the contract) contains language which points to termination of the benefits of retirees with the contract expiration, not to any survival or continuation thereafter.
The latter, under the heading Benefit Termination or
Disqualification

provides

"Subject to the terms and conditions of
applicable Collective Bargaining Agreements on any premium due date the Plan
Administrator may terminate the policy
or policies ... No consent of any participant... referred to in the policy or
policies is required to terminate...
the policy or policies..." (emphasis added)
Under Eligibility the Handbook reads:
"Employees are eligible for participation
and benefits under the Plan in accordance
with applicable negotiated Collective Eargaining Agreements...
(emphasis added)
Under When Insurance Terminates the Handbook
reads:
"Your insurance terminates when you are no
longer eligible or when the group policy
terminates, whichever happens first..."
1.

Note the need for ERISA to protect future pensions and
pensions of retirees under circumstances relevant to
the instant facts.

2.

The Union stipulated that its case is based solely on the
contract and alleged promises made to the retirees.

-3The foregoing clauses cannot logically be interpreted to
mean that retiress will enjoy coverage for life, even if as here,
the contract terminates and the plant closes permanently.

In my

view the more reasonable and proper interpretation is that the
retiree benefits are founded on an effective and continuing
collective bargaining agreement and group policies which are
part and parcel of that agreement. The premiums to the policies
are paid by the Company; when the contract ends, the contributions end, and the group policies end.

And those consequences

are supported by the foregoing provisions.
Indeed, if the Union is correct in its assertion that
retirees enjoy the benefits "for life" the Handbook's provisions
under Extended Benefits for continuation of benefits after "insurance terminates" for retirees "totally disabled," would be
unnecessary.

The grievants in this case are not disabled and do

not fall within

this exception.

The language can have only one

logical meaning that is applicable to this case, and that is that
there are circumstances under which the "insurance terminates"
short of a retiree's death.

I must conclude that in the instant

situation the insurance termination occurs when the contract and
the group policies terminate. As the grievants were not within
the excepted class of "disabled," their benefit coverage terminated as well. 3
The Union asserts that the retirees were promised coverage and benefits "for life" at a retirement dinner at which the

3. There is no dispute that the plant closed for bona fide
economic reasons and that the contract term had been completed as of December 4, 1982.

-4benefits were explained.

To be binding as a contractual

promise and as a "grafted on" addition to or amplification of
the otherwise silent contract, the promise must be shown as
explicit and authoratative.
short of that test.

The Union's evidence falls well

It is not clear who, if anyone, .made any

such promise.
The person or persons allegedly making the promise or
explaining the benefits could not be identified.

The testimony

tends towards the identification of a representative of the
insurance carrier, not the Company.

Without identification

and without evidentiary imputation to the Company, I cannot
find that any such promise or assurance was given which authoritatively bound the Company.

Probably, I think, any statement

that benefits for retirees would continue for life, was based
on implied and expected, albeit unstated assumptions that the
collective agreement and the group policies would continue in
place.
Finally, the fact that the Company may not have cancelled
the benefits during a prior strike period after the contract expired is not determinative for two reasons.

First, and again,

the evidence does not clearly establish that the disputed benefits were continued.

A reasonable interpretation of the testi-

mony on that point is as much supportive of the assertion that
the benefits paid during the strike were delayed payments for
a prior calendar period while the contract was in effect, as it
is supportive of a contrary conclusion.

And second, a strike

period is significantly different than a contract termination
and permanent plant closing.
In the former, a resumption of work and the renegotiation
of a contractual relationship are anticipated.

That being so,

an employer may continue benefits during the hiatus

between

-5-

contracts as a matter of strategy or as a realistic response
to the needs of those who are lawfully still employees and who
are expected to return to active employment.
benefited thereby).

(And the retirees

But those expectations are not present

when the plant is permanently closed at the contract expiration.
The severance of the employee-employer relationship is permanent, and no political

or practical reason exists to continue

benefits for former employees (or for retirees).
In short, if the Company continued benefits during the
strike period, it could do so for the reasons indicated, but
it may not have been required to do so.

That being so, that

situation provides no precedent for the prospective

continuation

of the benefits claimed in this case for retirees after the contract ended and the plant closed.
I am painfully mindful of the harsh consequences of this
decision.

Yet, as much as I deplore the loss of important

benefits by retirees, I am bound to the terms of the contract
and the facts as I see them.

I may not legislate provisions

or benefits which have not been bilaterally negotiated or agreed
to by the parties.

The result the Union seeks is for collective

bargaining or legislation, not arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Retiree benefits other than pension benefits,
do not survive the expiration of the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 21, 1985
STATE OF
New York)
.
COUNTY OF New York) " '
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E
AWARD
and
Arta Labs

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Permanent Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between the above
named Union and Employer and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of said parties at a hearing on January 8, 1985,
makes the following AWARD:
The grievant, Richard Raskin was laid off
out of seniority in violation of the contract.
The evidence established that at the time
of his layoff, the grievant was the shop
steward. I conclude that the Employer knew
or should have known that the grievant occupied that position. The grievant processed
enough grievances and represented the employees
in matters under the contract in a manner
sufficient to give notice to the Employer
of his status as the shop steward.
Under Section 7 paragraph (3), the shop
steward enjoys "super seniority11 and "shall
be the last one to be laid off in the plant,
provided film is being handled or processed
in the laboratory.
The evidence established that at the time of
the layoff film was being handled or processed
in the laboratory and that other bargaining
unit employees, with less seniority than the
grievant (or less than the grievant's "super
seniority") remained employed and were performing the work. Accordingly, under that

-2circumstance, the grievant as shop steward
should not have been laid off. Under the
facts established, his layoff violated the
express conditions of Section 7 paragraph
(3) of the contract.
Therefore the grievant is entitled to reinstatement and shall be reinstated and
made whole for wages lost as a result of
the layoff, less the amount of money he
received in severance pay and less any
other earnings he may have received from
gainful employment since his layoff.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: June 11, 1985
STATE OF New York )ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

E R I C J. S C H M E R T Z P.C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL or LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK II55O
(5IS)

56O-5854

August 16, 1985

Joseph Good, Esq.
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union
Legal Department
1710 Broadway
New York, N. Y. 10019
James W. Wimberly, Jr., Esq.
Mitchell, Clarke, Pate,
Anderson & Wimberly, Esqs.
Georgia Federal Savings Building
20 Marietta Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30335
RE: ILGWU -and- Barbizon Corporation
Gentlemen:
I enclose to you each herewith, two duly executed
copies of my Award and Opinion in the above matter.
My bill for services and expenses will be sent to
you under separate cover.
Very truly yours,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
EJS:hl
Encl.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Barbizon Corporation

This arbitration proceeding was held pursuant to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (the contract) covering the period from February 1, 1981, to January 31, 1983, between
the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (Union) and
Barbizon Corporation (Barbizon).
the Arbitrator.

The Undersigned was selected as

Hearings were held on November 14, 1982, December

22, 1983, and April 3, 5, 9 and June 19 and 28, 1984.

Both

parties presented oral testimony, documents and legal memoranda
and each party submitted a post-hearing original brief, an answering brief and a reply brief.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union initiated the grievances which are the subject
of this proceeding by a letter of complaint, dated July 21, 1983,
which was amended by a letter of complaint, dated August 24, 1983.
These written complaints alleged Barbizon had violated the contract by: (1) failing to pay required benefit fund contributions;
(2) operating a non-union shop in Puerto Rico; (3) using nonunion outside contractors; and (4) refusing to furnish certain
books and records to the union auditors to enable the union to
determine whether Barbizon had used additional non-union outside
contractors.
At the first hearing, the Union purported to amend its
complaint by claiming the contract was extended by operation
of law beyond January 31, 1983, and demanded access to Barbizon's
books and records for the extended period.

The Union withdrew

-2-

this last claim in its original brief.

Furthermore, the parties

have reported that the first claim (benefit fund contributions)
has been settled and it has been withdrawn.
The Union has demanded liquidated damages in the amount of
$211,292.28 for Barbizon's use of non-union outside contractors.
The amount demanded is not in dispute as constituting a correct
calculation if Article XXIV of the contract is applicable and
enforceable.

It also demands damages for Barbizon's operation

of the non-union shop in Puerto Rico.

Further, the Union demands

access to the books and records denied it by Barbizon and damages,
if any, based on what an audit would reveal concerning Barbizon's
use of non-union outside contractors.
THE ISSUES
(1)

Did Barbizon violate Article XXX of the contract by

employing non-union outside contractors during the term of the
agreement under conditions which did not meet the requirements
of Article XXX?
(2)

If Barbizon did violate Article XXX, would payment of

liquidated damages to the Union in accordance with paragraph 1
of Article XXIV of the contract violate the provisions of LMRA
Section 302?
If such payment does not violate Section 302, is the liquidated damage clause (par. I, Art. XXX) enforceable as a matter of
contract law? If not, what is the measure of damages?
(4)

Did Barbizon's operation of a non-union plant in

Albonito, Puerto Rico, violate the contract or the supplemental
letter agreement, dated June 19, 1981, or both?
(5)

If the operation of the non-union plant in Puerto Rico

violated an agreement between the parties, what is the proper
measure of damages?

-3-

(6)

Are any of the Union's claims time-barred in whole or

in part?
(7)

Did Barbizon violate the contract when it refused to

give the Union access to certain books and records?
(8)

Is the Union entitled to interest on a damage award?

BARBIZON'S USE OF NON-UNION OUTSIDE CONTRACTORS
It is undisputed

that Barbizon used non-union outside

contractors from February 1, 1981, for a period during the
83 contract."

1980-

The Union claims that this use of non-union out-

side contractors by Barbizon violated paragraph 5 of Article XXX
of the contract (hereafter "outside contractor" clause).

Para-

graph 5, Article XXX, provides:
In order to safeguard working standards and
employment opportunities of the employees
covered by this and other agreements in the
garment industry, it is agreed that all garments or parts thereof (not including the application of trim or embroidery) manufactured
and/or distributed by the Employer during the
term of this agreement, whether finished or
partly finished, shall be manufactured exclusively either in its own plants or, as parts
of an integrated process of production under
the jobber-contractor system of production,
in a plant under contract with a unit of the
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
and accordingly the Employer shall not handle,
purchase, or otherwise obtain, directly or
indirectly, any other wholly or partly finished
garments whatsoever (not including the application of trim or embroidery) during the term of
this agreement.
Barbizon claims that the contract permitted it to use such
contractors because it met the requirements of paragraph 8 Article
XXX which provides:
The provisions contained in the immediately
preceding paragraphs shall not apply to the
imports of piece goods, laces, buttons and
the like, and to garments and accessories if,
at the time an Employer desires to purchase

Apparently its use of non-union outside contractors for the
earlier part of the contract term was the subject of a $10,000
payment to the Union by Barbizon (Daniels, T.733). However, the
Union had not filed a grievance with respect to Barbizon 1 s use
of non-union outside contractors prior to the one which initiated
this proceeding. (Fischer, T.92)

-4-

or manufacture or otherwise obtain such
garments or accessories, they could not
be manufactured in shops with contractual
relations with International or any affiliate thereof.
Resolution of this aspect of the dispute requires examination of some contested facts, characterization of the facts established by the evidence and determining the meaning of and applying paragraph 8 of Article XXX (hereafter referred to as the
"exemption clause").
The use of outside contractors (union or non-union) was not
a matter of serious concern for Barbizon until it determined to
and did close down its own union shops.

This was a process which

began in the early 70's, but Barbizon's need for outside contractors did not become acute until it began to close its union
plant in Provo, Utah, in 1979.
completed in June, 1981.

The closing of this plant was

When it closed production in 1979, the

Provo plant produced 92% of Barbizon's output.

There was testi-

mony from witnesses called by Barbizon that with Provo's closing,
Barbizon was under time pressure to meet its need for outside
contractors and by the early part of 1981 the need had become
"critical".

(T. 135-36, 130, 139).

Barbizon had a need for

facilities with adequate production capacity, an ability to meet
production and delivery schedules and with machine operators able
to handle the special fabrics and special manufacturing requirements and equipment used for Barbizon's production specifications
Barbizon products xvere in the higher price range and
Barbizon sought to and had conveyed an image of quality to the
consuming public.

Quality was reflected in the fabrics which

were produced by Barbizon and in some special steps in the
manufacturing process.

The fabrics required handling unique to

their special characteristics and the manufacturing process required some special machinery as well as adaptation of the non-

-5-

special machinery to satisfy Barbizon's product specifications.
It was necessary to train the operators who ordinarily would not
be familiar with the requirements for those fabrics.

There was

no claim to the contrary and the evidence was that there was no
correlation between the status of operators as union or non-union
with respect to the ability of Barbizon to train them and their
ability to learn.
It was possible, but not likely that a contractor would own
or otherwise possess the special machinery needed for Barbizon

•
production.

The machinery could be acquired by purchase or rent

or even loaned by Barbizon.

Here, too, there was no distinction

among contractors necessarily related to the existence or nonexistence of an ILGWU contract with the contractor.
It appears from the evidence that upon closing of the Provo
operation, Barbizon had not assured itself of sufficient outside
contractors either with respect to the quantity of its expected
production or with respect to those contractors Barbizon considered "suitable" for the work.

In fact, there was evidence that

during 1980 and 1981 problems with respect to the production of
goods by a concededly good union contractor, Dorfman & Hoffman,
were attributable to the changes in Barbizon's operations.
(T. 536-7).
The search for outside contractors appears to have begun
sometime in 1980 with efforts by several production managers and
quality control people and some Barbizon executives.
tensive efforts were warranted in early 1981.

More in-

These efforts

involved advertisements in Women's Wear Daily and other newspapers, requests for referrals addressed to the Union and contractors and various personal contacts by several Barbizon
executives.
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A few union contractors who were contacted were not interested, according to Barbizon, and a larger number were not deemed suitable for various reasons.

Of this latter group, only a

small number were specifically identified and reasons for rejection by Barbizon were offered for an even smaller number.
Several witnesses called by Barbizon described the problems
Barbizon claimed it was having in finding union shops and meeting
its production requirements when it did use outside union contractors.

The difficulties were described as those shops not

having either cutting facilities, machinery or required capacity
or that their prices were too

high.

As for prices, while not

conceding that most union shops' prices were too high, it was
conceded that price was partially the reason for Barbizon's
difficulties, but not with respect to every single shop. (T.134-5,
142).

Some witnesses testified in rather conclusory terms, but

others did identify a few union shops and claimed they had one
or more specific problems with respect to such factors as cleanliness, production capacity and the ability of the contractor's
operators to work the Barbizon fabrics and the special machinery
and processes required for Barbizon's specifications.
tion, price or cost was a factor and

In addi-

sometimes the only factor

identified as a reason for not awarding work to a union shop.
There was some evidence of manufacturing difficulties and a
failure to meet production and delivery schedules when the shops
were awarded the work.
The first Barbizon witness with respect to the search was
Mr. Edward Vittorio, who was a production manager charged with
finding outside contractors.

His employment by Barbizon began

sometime at the end of 1979 or the beginning of 1980 and ended
in February or March 1981.

According to Vittorio he was one of
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three production managers pursuing this search.

The other two

did not testify.
Vittorio testified that Barbizon was satisfied with the
union contractors given work by Barbizon upon Provo's closing.
He named only one union plant that he had visited in his search,
but never testified whether or not it was satisfactory.

He

described problems with production and delivery as critical when
he left Barbizon in early 1981.
concerning

A repeated theme of his testimony

the employment of union contractors was that Barbizon

has to "settle" rather than select.

He never identified specific

respondents to advertisements nor associated specific reasons for
rejection by Barbizon with a specific contractor.

He concluded

that Barbizon had done all it could to find union contractors.
Mr. David Kerr, 40 years with Barbizon played a role in
quality control with Barbizon contractors.

He had set up facil-

ities in Costa Rica and Blue Bay, Pennsylvania, and found that
most operators had no experience with Barbizon's special needs.
With respect to one specification ("roll stitch") he testified
there are problems to this day.

He testified there were quality

problems in 1980 and 1981 and reports of visits to union contractors reporting some problems were received in evidence.

He

concluded much of the problem was due to lack of experience on
the part of the outside union contractors and the lack of equipment .
As to specific contractors, he testified one was a "nightmare" with respect to quality and that there had been a contract
dispute with it (New Quaker).

Others also had quality problems

(SLC, Sayre) or were "loaded to capacity" (D&H, J.D.V.) or had
insufficient equipment (Exeter). According to Kerr, he visited
so many shops he couldn't remeber them, i.e. maybe 12 or 15 shops.

-8-

Most, he said, had no further capacity to handle Barbizon's production and no equipment.
equipment in early 1980.

However, Barbizon had loaned D&H
In 1981, Kerr concluded he couldn't

seem to find any shops with sufficient capacity to be of any
value and those he found wanted Barbizon to supply the special
equipment.
He did locate Charles Henry, a non-union contractor, in the
South.

It had equipment, had manufactured lingerie previously

and was willing to do Barbizon work exclusively.
was engaged by Barbizon.

Charles Henry

Kerr testified that Barbizon supplied

some additional equipment to Charles Henry.

It also had supplied

equipment to shops in Venezuela and Costa Rica.

According to

Kerr and other witnesses, some of Barbizon's equipment also had
been supplied to Better Cutting, a plant opened by a former
Barbizon executive.
Kerr conceded that people could be trained to use the
machines properly and that he had trained them.

If they had some

experience, it would take a "very short period" of training.

Even

though the Costa Rican operators could not be trained to operate a
"tucking machine", one of those needed to meet Barbizon's specifications, that shop was still used by Barbizon.

Kerr, who was

not involved in quality control in 1980 and appears to have had
his basic experience in mechanical and maintenance problems of
machines and buildings, testified he knew nothing about pricing
or price as a factor in the selection of contractors.
William Mandera, a Barbizon employee for 34~35 years and
involved with design and the management of design, testified that
in 1981, the quality of work for Barbizon was poor.

He speculated

that it might have been due to the operators or the lack of
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contractor engineering support for the machines.

Charles Henry,

he testified, had the proper equipment, the mechanics on hand
and did good quality work.

It did Barbizon work for eight months,

when, in order to comply with the contract the business was given
to union contractors after Charles Henry went out of business.
It appears from Company Exhibit 13, that this occurred in
February, 1982.
Joseph Massey joined Barbizon as a Vice-President for
Manufacturing in May, 1981, when he found Barbizon was faced
with problems from lack of production capacity. Outside contractors were "basically booked" and as a consequence Barbizon
had delivery problems.

He described some contractors as booked

to capacity (D&H, Sayre, West Orange) and another as a competitor
of Barbizon concentrating

more on its own work than the con-

tractor part of its business (SLC).

Another had burned down but

Barbizon loaned it equipment and helped re-establish the business
(JVD).

New Quaker, the competitor which had been involved in a

contract dispute with Barbizon, refused to do work for Barbizon,
according to Massey.
He testified there were efforts to obtain union contractors
through written and oral requests to the Union.

The need was

great because 1981 was a "boom" season; it was followed by a
sharp downturn.

According to Company witness, Charles Henry was

used in 1981 to do the excess work union operators would not do
for Barbizon in 1981 (T. 267).

Charles Henry did satisfactory

work, but Barbizon preferred union shops, Massey testified.
Barbizon was Charles Henry's only customer.

When the work was

given to union shops at the beginning of the Spring, 1982 season
Charles Henry was shut down.
him down". (T. 268).

Massey stated, "We (Barbizon) shut
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Massey stated that union shops refused to do samples for
Barbizon and Asia Perez, a small non-union operation, agreed
to do them provided Barbizon gave Asia Perez additional work
during the year.
to do samples.

Barbizon did so.

He stated he had asked D&H

His testimony contains no D&H response to the

request. While he had no personal knowledge about requests of
other contractors to do samples, Massey said he believed Kerr
had made inquiries of smaller contractors.
about such inquiries.

Kerr did not testify

JDV and Stanley, union contractors, did

samples in the summer of 1982, but were unwilling to do so prior
to that time.
Company Exhibit 13 was introduced through Massey.

It

purported to show delivery and quality problems with contractors
during 1981 and 1982.

It identified contractors as union or

non-union, the original delivery date of a specific "cut #"
(authorization or order) and comments on quality and delivery
problems.

It did not show the reasons for the alleged deficiency,

such as late delivery of goods to the contractor by Barbizon or
contractor deficiencies.
Mr. Massey also testified with respect to extensive
negotiations concerning a new plant Barbizon established in
Albonito, Puerto Rico which is considered later in this Opinion.
He testified that the Albonito plant operated for 1 to 1% years
before it was profitable.

(T. 313-14).

Nancy Gross and Susan Fay Krivit handled customer complaints
for Barbizon and testified there were a large number of complaints
in 1981 and 1982.

Some letters were produced, but those prior

to that period and some for 1981 had been destroyed.

The ones

-11produced were from January to March, 1981, November and December,
1981, and the first 4~6 months of 1982.
of the goods were not identified.

The manufacturing sources

Further, there was no evidence

about the cause of the claimed deficiencies.
Anthony Ritter, President of Barbizon since 1979 and connected with the Company since 1951, described Barbizon's history as
the only vertical operation in the woven field and as one of
several high-quality manufacturers in the sleepwear field.

He

described in detail the uniqueness of the Barbizon fabrics and
the special character of the manufacturing process for its daywear and sleepwear.

Forty percent of Barbizon's fabric, "Cuddle-

skin", was sold to other manufacturers.

Ritter reiterated that

when Barbizon closed its Provo plant, demand was high and in 1980
and 1981 Barbizon's need for contractors intensified.

He also

described a large turnover of management personnel in 1980 and
early 1981.
Ritter testified that in December, 1980, he became alarmed
at returns for poor quality.

He took various steps such as

memoranda to contractors, delivering to the Union a list of poor
contractors not to be recommended.

He even went so far as to show

his people a film on quality control produced for another major
corporation.

As part of a monitoring process, he announced in

writing a policy to document all visits to contractors.
A search for union contractors not affiliated with their own
product line (T. 426) was conducted at his request by his production people and one, Daniel King, who contacted state offices.
Ritter also made inquiries and he requested Barbizon employees
to make requests of the Union.

Newspaper advertisements also

were run.
As for union contractors, Barbizon used D&H during 1981, and
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it probably could have increased production but, according to
Ritter, not at the right time of the year.

JDV, another union

contractor, was fine but it had burned down.

Prior to its

destruction, Barbizon had agreed to supply JDV with equipment
and to support the enlargement of its premises.

Sayre, another

union contractor was the subject of rumors of the retirement of
its founder and Ritter stated it was characterized by poor planning,
shortages and late deliveries.

Better Cutting was ill-equipped

to enlarge production or provide more than a few samples.

Gossard

was sold and closed. Exhibit 13 shows this occurred in April, 1981
New Quaker and SLC were competitors and relegated Barbizon's
production to a secondary position.

Furthermore, according to

Ritter, there were quality and delivery problems with the former
and a claim of copying goods with the latter.

He described the

experience with West Orange as poor -- "slovenly" and "no
engineering."
SLC in 1981.

However, he did do business with West Orange and
Union shops represented by Peter Letkany located

in Brooklyn and visited by Ritter were "unclean," "unprofessional"
and in "bad areas."

There were also thefts, shortages, late

deliveries and an instance of counterfeiting with those shops.
Charlotte Undergarment, a shop recommended by the Union, had been
the subject of a very bad prior experience with Barbizon.
According to Ritter, Charles Henry was selected because of
its experience in lingerie and woven goods and it devoted its
entire operation to Barbizon production.

It had most of the

necessary equipment and Barbizon loaned it the balance required.
Ritter's recollection was that Charles Henry was phased out toward the end of 1982, because of a soft economy and the availability of union contractor capacity.

(T. 441-2).

Exhibit 13

(p. 34) shows discontinuance of Charles Henry in what appears to
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be the very early part of 1982 and union contractors used thereafter.

As for Asia Perez, it did samples and needed additional

work to stay in business.

Ritter identified three other non-union

shops used by Barbizon, although he thought one contractor
(Kellwood) was using its union shop.
The Union called several witnesses, including Roger Home,
a plant manager for New Quaker.

He testified that New Quaker had

its own quality line to which it devoted 80% of its manufacturing
capacity.

The balance was devoted to contractor work, including

Chevette and Christian Dior.

It had experience with and still

does "Cuddleskin" and did contract work for Barbizon from May,
1980, to February, 1981.

There was a fall-off of Barbizon ship-

ments of trim early October to mid-December, 1980, and on March
27, 1980, it received a letter from Barbizon acknowledging that
"Barbizon has had some problems historically with the efficiency
of [Barbizon's] scheduling system," requesting that Barbizon be
notified about shipment problems and of shut-down dates for New
Quaker so that Barbizon could plan its production with New Quaker.
(U. Exh. 12).
Home denied that New Quaker had ever refused work from
Barbizon and in fact testified that he had discussed and been
promised more business by Barbizon's Kerr from February to April,
1981.

(T. 629-35; U. Exh. 13). He denied he had received adverse

comments from Kerr and when Kerr visited the plant Kerr stated
he believed New Quaker had received additional Barbizon work.
Home testified about the dispute v/ith Barbizon which concerned
whether or not Barbizon was liable for increased costs due to
retroactive taxes.

New Quaker held Barbizon machines and the

dispute was resolved by an exchange of some of the machines in
satisfaction of New Quaker's claims.

(T. 635-37; U. Exh. 15).
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He testified New Quaker could have handled Barbizon work in 1981
and 1982, if requested.
In response, Jack Kreshover, a 40 year employee with New
Quaker (or its parent company) was called as a witness by
Barbizon.

He left New Quaker after a dispute with New Quaker.

The subject of the dispute is not in the record, but Kreshover
testified he objected to New Quaker's position in its contract
dispute with Barbizon concerning retroactive taxes and he had
complained that New Quaker was using Barbizon machines for New
Quaker's product line.

He testified that while initially there

were few complaints from Barbizon about New Quaker's work, complaints increased rapidly toward the end of their relationship.
He attributed increased quality problems at New Quaker to use of
inexperienced operators and relegating Barbizon work to a subcontractor and giving primary effort to New Quaker's own line.
He also described trouble he had with the Union because New
Quaker had used a non-union plant (Millcrest) instead of a union
plant (Dushore) for some of its work.
was done at Dushore.

Some of the Barbizon work

He conceded that Barbizon's delivery of

trim to New Quaker often had been late and the trim faulty.

At

the time he testified, he did business with both Barbizon and
New Quaker's parent company.
Bennett Lyons, the President of D&H, testified D&H did and
continues to do substantial business with Barbizon.

In 1981, he

stated, due to the changeover in Barbizon's operation in 1980 and
1981, they experienced an increased number of quality problems in
goods supplied by Barbizon.

Some were reflected in letters and

memoranda to Barbizon (T. 536-72; U. Exh. 7-10).

In 1981 and 1982

there were many late Barbizon deliveries not typical of other
periods.

There also was difficulty due to inadequate lead times

-15-

for the Fall and Spring season (T. 551-52).

He detailed numerous

problems caused by Barbizon deficiencies, some of which were listed as union contractor problems in Co. Exh. 13.
He testified that Barbizon never requested D&H to make samples
and D&H had substantial new capacity when it acquired its
Somerset plant in the summer of 1980 and advised Barbizon of its
availability.

Barbizon never responded.

Historically, D&H had

never refused to give Barbizon all the production it requested
(T. 572), and it would have made every effort to handle Barbizon's
work in its Somerset plant in 1981 if there had been a request.
He conceded that increased work for Barbizon in 1981 most likely
would have meant cutting back on production for others, but it is
unclear if this comment concerned the Somerset plant because his
testimony consistently
original plants.

distinguished between Somerset and D&H's

All witnesses who testified on the point

conceded D&H's work was satisfactory.
Charles Azrak, the owner of Valmar, a union shop, did work
for Christian Dior and other high priced lines.

To obtain

Barbizon business in April to November 1979, he cut his price to
Barbizon by 15-20%.

He did work for Barbizon using Cuddleskin

and received no complaints and had no problems.

He had the

capacity to produce the Barbizon product and was willing to do
samples and duplicates during the relevant period.

(T. 597-602).

Victor Rosenblum, the President of Millicent Lingerie and
R&W, testified to available capacity and that it would have been
easy for him to expand.

Some of the Barbizon-supplied fabrics

were defective, but the Barbizon inspectors characterized his
work as good.
In rebuttal, Mr. Ritter testified that Azrak did loungewear
and this did not provide sufficient expertise for handling
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Cuddleskin sleepwear and further it would have been too costly
for Barbizon to oversee an operation with so small a capacity.
He testified similarly with respect to Millicent's capacity.

As

for Azrak, Ritter said he believed Azrak had a policy typical of
most contractors not to sew samples unless the style was manufactured in the shop.
THE USE OF NON-UNION OUTSIDE CONTRACTORS —
It is undisputed

DISCUSSION

that non-union contractors were used by

Barbizon during the relevant period.

To determine whether the

contract was breached by Barbizon requires the application of
the exemption provision to the facts of record.

The contract

agreed to by the parties is the sole standard for determining
this issue.

The exemption is a defense to breach and in accord

with general rules governing defenses and more importantly in the
context of this contract Barbizon has the burden of establishing
the defense.
Up until the 1980 agreement, there had been no exemption
clause in the ILGWU-Barbizon agreements.

In fact, the record

shows that no ILGWU contract contained this type of clause.

Thus,

without the exemption clause the only provision applicable to
Barbizon was the outright prohibition on the use of non-union
shops.

The importance of this prohibition cannot be overstated;

indeed, its legality, not challenged in this proceeding, rests on
special legislative authorization.

It was an important part of

the Union's contracts throughout the industry and it was enforced
by the Union.
Barbizon's request for an exemption clause in the 1980-83
contract met with strong Union opposition.

It is uncontradicted

that its request for an exemption clause which would recognize
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an inability to meet delivery dates and the like as a defense
was rejected outright.

A narrowly fashioned channel to exemption

was negotiated in categorical language, i.e. Barbizon could use
non-union shops if it "could not" manufacture the goods in union
shops.

Further, in the failed negotiations for a successor con-

tract, Barbizon demanded an exemption clause which would have
permitted a defense of an inability to find "suitable" union contractors with explicit references to competitive price and the
like as characteristics of suitability.

This was rejected by the

Union and is evidence that the 1980-83 contract recognized no
such grounds for exemption.
Mr. Vittorio was correct when he testified that Barbizon
could not "select," but had to "settle" when it came to outside
contractors.

Limitation on conduct is the very essence of con-

tractual obligation and Barbizon's rights with respect to using
outside contractors were sharply limited by the contract.

Indeed,

much of the evidence offered in Barbizon's behalf reflected its
inability to select and frustration at the contractual compulsion
to "settle."

I need not determine whether its motives involved

a desire to avoid dealing with union contractors entirely or to
avoid the economic costs or operational realities (which is nothing more than another matter of costs) involved in dealing with
union contractors.

None of these reasons satisfies the narrow

defense established by paragraph 8 of Article XXX of the contract.
The evidence, even when viewed most favorably to Barbizon,
supports a conclusion no broader than that Barbizon would incur
economic costs if it used union contractors.

Even severe economic

costs would not be a defense to the breach of Article XXX, paragraph 5, for this is one of the risks necessarily implicit in the
prohibition clause itself and the narrowly stated exemption in
in paragraph 8 does not provide for avoidance of economic costs.
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It applies only when products "could not" be manufactured in
ILGWU shops.

The language suggests impossibility or something

close ot it as the standard for exemption.

Wilbur Daniels, who

negotiated it for the Union, testified to this very narrow scope
of the clause.

(T. 707).

There was no contrary evidence and

Daniels' view is consistent with the contract language.

Indeed

the words "impossible" and the phrase "unable to be done" are
dictionary synonyms.

It is unnecessary to determine the precise

limit of the language to conclude that avoidance of economic
costs or operational inefficiences under the circumstances of
this case are not defenses.

In any event, the evidence in this

case does not establish the level of economic costs involved in
compliance or that union shops were unavailable.
It is clear that Barbizon's difficulties can be traced to
the closing of its Provo plant.
issue.

Its right to do so is not an

However, the consequences of closing the plant and its

changeover from using its own shops to reliance on outside contractors necessarily are affected by the prohibition of Article
XXX, paragraph 5.

Problems were initially inevitable for a

manufacturer as concerned with quality control as Barbizon claimed
Seymour Rosenberg, President of New York Sewing Machine Attachment
Corp., who made special machines for Barbizon and the industry
generally described the kind of experience required to produce
Barbizon products and testified that to avoid problems which
Barbizon said it met with outside contractors, most better manufacturers like Barbizon manufactured in places they owned.
109,

(T.

114).
Mr. Lyons described the difficulties in 1980 and 1981 as

attributable to Barbizon's change in operations and D&H, by all
accounts, did a good job with Barbizon production. While Company
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Exhibit 13, an exhibit prepared for the Arbitrator, indicated some
deficiencies in delivery and production by some union shops, there
was substantial testimonial and documentary evidence of contemporaneous deficiencies in Barbizon's goods and its meeting its
delivery obligations which presents a picture of a general decline in Barbizon's own organization
period.

for production during this

The probability that this was so is supported by the

substantial turnover of some middle management employees charged
with production during the period.
While Barbizon claims it "could not" produce in union outside contractors shops and had to use non-union shops because
with the union shops there were additional costs attendant to
insufficient available capacity or expertise or experience and/or
it had some bad experiences with delivery and manufacturing
defects, it attributes practically no problems at all to the nonunion shops it used.
Reduced to the essentials, the evidence shows claimed or
possible economic costs in the use of union shops.

This is

evidenced by frequent references to price or competitive price
or the need to train operators or the costs of monitoring union
shops as reasons for not using union shops. Difficulties with
production because of perceived or actual contractor difficulties
with operators or lack of machinery or delivery problems are not
sufficient.

Whatever force they might have in another factual

context, it is insufficient here because there is evidence that
Barbizon could and sometimes did remedy these perceived deficiencies by expending its own resources in training, providing machinery, and supervising quality control when dealing xvith union and
non-union contractors.

In the context of this case, these are

merely economic problems.
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Th e consumer complaint letters establish little except that
there were some defective pieces produced.

However, even if

relevant, none of the goods was attributed to a particular shop
and there is nothing in the record which indicates the significance
of the relatively small number of complaints in evidence in the
context of the thousands of dozen pieces produced by or for
Barbizon.
As for unavailable capacity, the proof falls far short of
establishing this Barbizon contention.

Indeed, it may well show

the contrary in view of Barbizon's failure to follow up on
Somerset in particular and D&H generally, as well as R&W, Millicent
and Valmar.

The evidence shows that the use of Asia Perez surely
.
could have been avoided considering its relatively small capacity

and that Somerset would have equalled Charles Henry's output.
The search was neither thorough nor well documented.
The real thrust of Barbizon's evidence is not that it "could
not" find union contractors, but that it would suffer some econnomic harm if compelled to use some union contractors. The
.
economic harm, if any, however, appears to be characteristic of
the immediate effect of Barbizon starting a new kind of operation.
Thus, the evidence shows that for a year to a year and a half
from its commencement, the Albonito, Puerto Rican non-union shop
was not profitable but Barbizon continued to use it.

The change

from the Provo operation to outside shops as with the Albonito
shop was the beginning of a new operation and bore the characteristics of one for which Barbizon was not wholly prepared.

When

Provo closed, insufficient outside contractors shops had been
identified, Barbizon deliveries to contractors often were late,
plans for a particular season were not in place in sufficient
time and there was significant middle management turnover.

It
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may well have not been preared for the boom season.
Even accepting Barbizon's assertions that some union shops
were deficient, and some of that evidence was contested, it does
not meet the burden of proving it "could not" obtain union shop
contractors.

The so-called deficiencies could be remedied by

Barbizon and Barbizon concedes it had done so with respect to
some contractors, union, non-union and foreign.

The burden of

doing so and the economic costs of doing so was allocated to
Barbizon under the contract.
to "settle" and not select

Under the contract language it had

free of contract limitations.

Indeed

the continued use of the Costa Rican shop even though its operators could not be trained to use the special "tucking" machine
casts doubt on Barbizon's reasons for not using some union contractors .
There is one significant point which transcends Barbizon's
case - and that is that to use union shops would involve additiona
costs.

Either direct costs of production, or costs attendant to

supervision, training of employees and/or in providing additional
or needed equipment.

Barbizon's use of non-union shops may have

been supported by good business judgment and, except for the contract restrictions could be sustained.

But it is to the contract

that the Arbitrator is bound.
Let me summarize my findings based on the critical contract
language.

Article XXX does not allow for the circumvention of

union shops because of costs or operational difficulties.

In view

of Barbizon's prior help to non-union shops in providing equipment
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and in training employee's I find that Barbizon had no less a
duty to do so for the union shops in the instant circumstances,
in order to comply with the spirit and intent of the contract
restriction.

Especially so when, as here, Barbizon's problems

were in large measure of its own making due to closing its own
plant.
The contract restriction is rigid, and the exemption is
narrow.

In the instant case,

union shops were clearly available

and the work could have been done in and by these shops had
Barbizon in some instances been willing to incur additional costs
and had it met the foregoing duty.

Considering the unrefuted

testimony on the negotiations history of this narrow exemption
to what had previously been an absolute contract prohibition on
the use of non-union contractors, and Barbizon's unsuccessful
attempt in recent negotiations to expand the exemption if union
shops were "unsuitable," I must conclude that the present contract
language allowing for the use of non-union shops only if the goods
could not be made in a union shop is the sole exception to the
ban on use of non-union contractors.

And that the reasons advanced

by Barbizon in this proceeding do not meet that narrow test.
In sum, as a key Barbizon witness stated, I find that what
Barbizon was attempting to do was to "select" for business purposes, what it viewed, as the suitable shops, and to avoid "settling" on what it considered non-suitable union shops.
tract does not support

this purpose or action.

The con-

That right re-

mained a matter for collective bargaining and not arbitration.
Simply put, "suitability" and "expensiveness" are not synonymous
with "cannot be manufactured."
Additionally, the foregoing not withstanding, there is ample
evidence in the record showing that in fact there were available
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union shops capable of performing the Barbizon work without
significant additional costs and/or operational problems.

At

the very least the record establishes that Barbizon failed to
adequately consider or contact those union shops, or rejected
serious

consideration of their use on grounds beyond Barbizon's

contract rights.
THE USE OF THE ALBONITO, PUERTO RICO, PLANT
Contemporaneously with the parties agreement to the 1980-83
contract (the master agreement) they entered into a side agreement
dated June 19, 1981.

There were extensive negotiations concern-

ing this side agreement and negotiations concerning the Albonito
plant followed as well.

The evidence shows that the Employer's

plant in Albonito, Puerto Rico, was not covered by the master
agreement.

It xvas covered by that side agreement which provided

that conditions for any newly-opened

inside shop "would be nego-

tiated to conform with the area standards in the area of its
location."

The undisputed evidence also showed that the parties

continued to negotiate the terms of an agreement for the Puerto
Rican shop until long after the Master Agreement had expired and
until the Employer had expressed a good-faith doubt about the
Union's majority at the one remaining Union facility.

Accordingly

I hold that the Employer met its obligations under the side agreement and the Union's request for damages premised on the Employer
sending work to its non-union inside shop in Puerto Rico must be
denied.
DAMAGES
The Union relies on paragraph 1 of Article XXIV for the
measure of damages.

It provides:

Should the Employer have any work performed
in a non-ILGWU plant in violation of Article XXX,
the parties agree that such violation would result in damaging the interest of the employees
represented by the Union and of the Union itself
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in the establishment and maintenance of the
labor standards provided in this agreement.
The parties also agree the specific amount
of damage to the Union upon such violation
is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain.
Therefore it is agreed that upon such violation
the Employer shall pay twenty percent (20%) of
the contractor's statement without any offsetting
credits.
Barbizon claims:
(1) a payment by Barbizon to the Union pursuant to the liquidated damage clause would violate LMRA section 302; and
(2) in any event, the clause involves the imposition of a
penalty and therefore is not enforceable as a matter of contract
law.
THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAUSE AND 302
Barbizon argues that payment of damages to the Union pursuant
to the liquidated damages clause would violate section 302(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act. Section 302(a) and its
counterpart for unions, 302(b) provide:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer to
pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend,
or deliver, any money or other things of
value - (1) to any representative of any of his
employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce; or
(2) to any labor organization, or any
officer or employee thereof, which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees
of such employer who are employed in an
industry affecting commerce; or
(b) (1) It shall be unalwful for any person
to request, demand, receive, or accept, or
agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan,
or delivery of any money or other thing of
value prohibited by subsection (a) of this
section.
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Th e Union argues that such payment is excepted from the prohibitions of section 302(a) and (b) by virtue of 302(c)(2), which
provides:
(c) The provisions of this section shall not
be applicable.

*

*

*

(2) with respect to the payment or delivery
of any money or other thing of value in satisfaction^ of a judgment of any court or a decision
or award of an arbitrator or impartial chairman or in compromise, adjustment, settlement,
or release of any claim, complaint, grievance,
or dispute in the absence of fraud or duress.

*

*

*

I find that the payment or damages to the Union for breach
of Barbizon's contractual promise not to employ outside non-union
contractors does not violate section 302(a).

Whatever plausibility

there may be to Barbizon's arguments to the contrary dissolve on
analysis.
Barbizon would place the damage payments in this case in the
same category as payments declared to be prohibited by 302(a) in
ILA v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 326 F. 2d, 916 (2d Cir. 1964).

In

Seatrain, the Second Circuit decided that a contractual obligation
to pay money

to a union which was of the same kind covered by

302(c)(5) had to meet the requirements of 302(c)(5) and did not
satisfy the requirements of 302(c)(2) solely because it was based
on a contractual obligation.

Otherwise the court reasoned, the

prohibitions of 302(a) and the specific exceptions of 302(c) could
be nullified by characterizing all payments as settlements or
demands under 302(c)(2).

Consequently, the Court concluded that

the existence of a contractual obligation to pay money does not
alone create an exemption from 302(a) for the payment unless the
obligation to pay is authorized by or otherwise satifies applicable statutes.

It did not purport to and in fact explicitly
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refrained from defining the limits of 302(c)(2).
In Seatrain, the breach of contract was simply a failure to
pay money to the union.

Those were the terms of the agreement and

that was what was contemplated by the parties, and payments to the
union which did not satisfy an exception are barred by 302(a).
This case is materially different than Seatrain.
contractual obligation

Here, the

is that Barbizon may not use non-union

outside contractors unless certain conditions are met.

The breach

is the failure to abide by the promise not to use non-union outside contractors.

The obligation to pay is a consequence of that

breach; the breach is not the failure to honor a contractual promise to pay money which was the case in Seatrain.

Barbizon's

position would stand Seatrain's rationale on its head and transmute every payment of damages for breach of contract into a
contractual obligation to pay money and thereby preclude all
damage payments for breach of contract from satisfying the requirements of the 302(c)(2) exception.

We need not resolve the

jurisprudential and perhaps esoteric question whether payment of
damages for breach of contract and compliance with contractual
promises simply are options in the hands of the promissor. (See,
Holmes, "The Common Law" (Howe, ed., Little, Brown, Boston (1963)
at 236).

Here, we have a question of statutory construction and

there is no reason to exclude ordinary contract damages, liquidated or otherwise, from 302(c)(2).
Nothing in the legislative history, the language of 302 or
the reasoning or language of Seatrain requires excluding all
breach of contract claims from the coverage of 302(c)(2).

While

the fact that a contract requires the payment of money to the
union alone does not satisfy the requirements of 302(c)(2),
according to Seatrain, it does not follow that because a payment
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of a claim arises from a breach of contract, 302(c)(2) cannot be
satisfied.
Barbizon reluctantly recognized these implications of its
argument.

While conceding that ordinary contract damages could be

paid under 302(c)(2), it asserts that 302(c)(2) does not permit pay
ment of damages in this case because there is reliance on a contractual obligation to pay money to the Union within the meaning
of Seatrain.

I disagree.

If there were no liquidated damages clause and there was
either recovery of damages for breach of contract or payment in
a settlement of the claim, there would be no violation of 302.
The presence of a liquidated damage clause which merely measures
recovery for breach in advance of the breach does not change the
conclusion that 302(c)(2) is satisfied.

Here, the liquidated

damage clause is intended to and does serve the purpose of measuring damages for the breach of the non-monetary

contractual obliga-

tion not to use outside non-union contractors.

It is not intended

to be nor does it serve as a contractual alternative to another
obligation as in Seatrain, and there is no purpose to create a
source of unsupervised union funds as in Seatrain.

Compliance by

Barbizon with the substantive provisions (par. 5 and 8, Art. XXX)
is contemplated and desired by the Union.

To be sure, this does

not resolve the question of whether the liquidated damage clause
_
is enforceable as a matter of contract law, but it does resolve

E

he question of whether payment of damages for breach of contract
easured by that clause violates section 302.

I hold it does not

Because it qualifies as an exception under 302(c)(2).
THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAUSE UNDER THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
Barbizon argues that even if it breached the collective
Bargaining agreement, the Union suffered no damages and is not
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entitled to recover anything or at most it may recover nominal
damages.

In support of this proposition, it claims that Union

members lost little if anything by virtue of the breach because
there was no proof that there was available capacity which would
have employed any additional employees represented by the Union
if Barbizon had abided by its agreement.

In my findings concern-

ing breach of the agreement, I found that even assuming its relevance, there was a failure of proof to establish the lack of
available capacity and indeed, there appeared to be available
union contractor capacity which Barbizon could have utilized.
Hence, even assuming the materiality of Barbizon's position on
this point, the facts are contrary to its position.
Barbizon's contention that some damages must be established
before there can be recovery under the liquidated damage clause
is of doubtful validity in any event.

A rare opinion has suggest-

ed such a possibility, but this only would be applicable if no
damage at all was shown which is rare and not the case before me.
Dobbs, "Remedies" at 822.

See, e.g., Berger v. McBride & Son

Builders, Inc. 447 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. App. 1969). The majority of
jurisdictions reject even this limited proposition.
Barbizon also claims that Article XXIV

par. 1, is not a

liquidated damage clause at all but an "unliquidated or compensatory damage clause."

According to Barbizon, it has been con-

sistently ruled that for a liquidated damage clause to be valid
it must provide for a sum certain and must not require future
action by the court to determine the amount thereof.

"[D]amages

are unliquidated where they are in an uncertain quantity."

For

these rather surprising propositions, Barbizon cites various parts
of "Corpus Juris Secundum."

However, the authoritative view is

that liquidated damages may involve a sum certain provided in the
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contract or the application of an agreed formula for fixing
in the event a contract is breached.
§ 12.5, p. 821.

damage

See, e.g., Dobbs, "Remedies"

Evidence to establish the basis upon which the

sum certain is to be assessed or the formula applied always is
required and does not affect the status of the agreement as one
for liquidated damages.

See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 353

U.S. 210, 220 (1957).
Lastly and most vigorously, Barbizon urges that the clause
in reality is an agreement for the payment of a penalty and
consequently is unenforceable.

The Union responds that it is not

a penalty but even if it is, it is proper to award punitive
damages or impose a penalty for violation of an agreement under
section 301, LMRA.

Whatever the merits of the arguments

concern-

ing the arbitrator's power to make punitive awards, I need not
decide it because I find that the liquidated damages clause is
reasonable and necessary on the record of this proceeding and is
not a penalty.
The standards usually applied to determine if an agreement
is one for a liquidated damages rather than one for a penalty is
satisfied.

Damage to the Union as an institution or organization

by virtue of the breach of a non-monetary

obligation under a

collective bargaining agreement is difficult to measure in any
event.

It is no easier to ascertain at the time of breach than

when the agreement is made.

Here, where the violation of the

contract involves a vital aspect of the Union's power specially
sanctioned by law, the need to assure some measure of damages also
is necessary.

Thus, breach threatens the organizational

effec-

tiveness of the Union and its power with respect to representing
existing and prospective union members is jeopardized by breach.
Further, the national policy of the importance of union labor to
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the consuming public also is undermined.

That these are important

cannot be denied but their monetary value is difficult to measure.
At the time of contract, damages are difficult to prove and the
amount is uncertain, but it is certain that breach will damage the
Union.

Furthermore, damages remain difficult and uncertain at the

time of breach.

These aspects are similar to damages to the good

will of a business for which liquidated damage clauses have been
sustained.

See, e.g., Williams v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 201 (N.Y.

1839)

Barbizon argues, however, that the agreed formula is a penalty
because it is unreasonable and was designed as a penalty.

For

this it relies extensively on part of the testimony of Wilbur
Daniels, the Union negotiator, who did testify that, in part, the
formula was to serve as a deterrent for breach.

However, "all

provisions for damages are, of course, deterrents of default."
Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 413 (1947).
This does not make them "punitive" in the sense that they are
unenforceable agreements for penalties.
The inquiry concerning whether or not a clause is one for a
penalty essentially is concerned with the disproportionateness of
the amount of recovery

to the contemplated injury.

Is the sum

recoverable under the agreement "so large as to be characterized"
as a penalty?

See, Farnsworth, "Contracts" at 895.

Barbizon pre-

sented no evidence in support of a claim that the amount is disproportionate to the Union's loss.

It merely asserts it.

On its

face, the amount does not appear to be unreasonable, and is no
evidence or reason to believe it would be coercive in the sense
that the employer is left with no option but to comply
contract.

with the

Rather, the formula is designed not to permit breach

without cost and this is no indictment of its validity.
The current trend is to uphold clauses for liquidated damages
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especially where they have been the subject of intense negotiation
between parties of equal and substantial strength, where the damage
is real but the amount difficult to ascertain, the savings in
litigation costs make such a clause valuable and where some
assurance that damages will be assessed upon breach is necessary
to assure the integrity of the contractual arrangement.

Priebe &

Sons, v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); Bricklayers Union
21 v. Thorleif Larson & Son, Inc., 519 F. 2d 331, 337 (7th Cir.
1975); Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc., v. American National Insurance
Co., 388 F. Supp. 76, 83 (E.D. Mich. 1974).

All of these factors

are present in this case and I find that the Article XXIV, par. 1
is an enforceable agreement for liquidated damages and not one for
the imposition of a penalty.
ACCESS TO BOOKS AND RECORDS
Article XXVII, par. 2, of the collective bargaining agreement
provides:
With regard to any matter covered by this
agreement the Union may request the Employer
to submit to a representative of the Union
for examination such records and data are
pertinent or necessary in connection with the
Employer's compliance with this agreement.
Such request shall state the purpose for
which the examination is sought. In the
event of any dispute between the Employer
and the Union concerning the records to be
investigated or examined or concerning the
scope of the examination, the matter may be
referred by either party to the arbitrator
hereunder.
The Union claims it was denied access to certain books and
records to which it was entitled under the foregoing clause.
Barbizon claims the examination of the records and books are
neither "pertinent nor necessary" in connection with Barbizon's
compliance with the contract.

The parties agree that the issue

is referrable to the arbitrator for determination.
Edward Agra, supervisor of the Union's auditing department
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for seven years and an employee of the department for 22 years,
testified that Barbizon had never denied a Union request for
access to books and records until the audits for the February 1,
1982 - August 31, 1982 and the September 1, 1982 - January 31,
1983 periods.

Agra supervised the audits which were done by

Louie Denar, and Martin Hoffman, respectively.
Denar was denied access to the portion of the general ledger
showing Barbizon bank accounts.
of Barbizon

He also was not shown the books

Lingerie Corporation of Puerto Rico on grounds they

were "not available."

Those books were required to compute

contributions for the Albonito operation and to learn if non-union
contractors xvere used.

It was claimed Hoffman, the auditor for

the September 1, 1982 - January 31, 1983 period, was denied access
to parts of the general ledger, parts of the chart of accounts,
invoices with back-ups and cancelled checks.
There is some confusion in the record with respect to what
was shown for February 1 - August 31, 1982 period.

Beverly

Pegnator, a Barbizon audit employee, testified that for that
period the Union was shown only that portion of the general ledger
showing contractor accounts, there had been no request for cancelled checks and the Union was shown all invoices requested.

The

Union was shown only that part of the charge of accounts dealing
with contractors.

Thomas L. Foley, Barbizon's Vice-President for

finance, confirmed the substance of Pegnato's testimony.

Neither

made any clear distinction between the two audit periods except
Pegnato

confirmed the Union testimony that the books for Barbizon

Lingerie Corporation of Puerto Rico were not available and Foley
testified the Union was not given access to subsidiary

corporation

of Barbizon.

It is unclear whether Barbizon Lingerie was the only

subsidiary.

Pegnato began working for Barbizon in November, 1982,
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and Foley in December, 1981.

Neither had any personal knowledge

of prior practice with respect to Union audits.
The Union claims that it requires access to the entire genera"
ledger and all bank records, including statements and cancelled
checks, in order to determine whether there are payments to nonunion contractors which do not appear in that portion of the
accounts designated by Barbizon as covering outside contractors.
It claims it has never been denied access to books and records it
requested from Barbizon and its general practice in audits of all
employers is to see the general ledger.

The Union witness conced-

ed that it had not previously found Barbizon books to be false and
had filed no previous grievances against Barbizon with respect to
books and records.
Barbizon claims that the books and records they submitted to
the Union are sufficient for the purpose of learning about outside
contractors.

Foley conceded that the Union would have to rely on

Barbizon's words that the books shown the Union contain all the
necessary information about outside contractors.

However, Barbizon

had offered to supply a verification by Arthur Young & Company,
who audit Barbizon, with respect to matters which concerned the
Union.

The offer was repeated at the hearing.

Barbizon is a privately-held corporation which files no public
financial statements.

It deems its books to be "confidential."

There is very limited access to the general ledger which contains
the kind of information Barbizon would want to remain confidential
such as, its cash position, loans, assets and executive compensation.

Foley characterized the information supplied to the Union

as that which deals with the cost of manufacturing.

This is what

is "necessary and pertinent" under the contract, according to
Barbizon.
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The Union claims it should not be required to rely on
Barbizon's word or that of a third party auditor to determine
the existence of payments to outside contractors.

Such payment

can be concealed in a variety of ways and access to the entire
chart of accounts, the general ledger and bank records is the
only way a proper audit can be conducted to determine whether
there were payments to outside

contractors.

Barbizon argues that the imposition on it to reveal confidential information where there has not been a claim of dishonest
or faulty books is not justified.

Barbizon's offer of Arthur

Young's verification should suffice.

In any event, the Union is

not entitled to damages but only to the arbitrator's determination of which books and records should be made available.
The contract clearly provides that the Union should be provided all "pertinent or necessary" records and claims of confidentiality cannot preclude access to such records.

The importance

of the Union's contractual right to examine books is underscored
by the provision of paragraph 3 of Article XXVII that the "failure
of the Employer . . . to submit such books and records shall be
presumptive evidence of the violation complained of."

Uncontra-

dicted evidence that the Union had access to the records in the
past shows that both parties found them to be "necessary" or
"pertinent" under the contract, according to the Union.

As for

confidentiality, the Company has bargained away the claims where
records are "pertinent or necessary."
The evidence is somewhat confusing with respect to which
books and records Barbizon refused to submit to the Union.

Mr.

Agra was quite specific about different ones in the two audits;
whereas the Barbizon witnesses did not and apparently could not
distinguish the audits as sharply.

Agra claimed that Barbizon
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had not denied the Union's request for records in previous audits
but did not testify explicitly that a request for the general
ledger had been made.

Donald Fischer, the Union's Director of

Welfare Funds Control and involved in audits for the Union for
almost 35 years, testified that access to general ledgers was
common and necessary.
be discovered.

It was the only way hidden payments could

Barbizon did not deny this assertion but claims

there is no basis for believing Barbizon's records limited to
contractors are incomplete, false and, in any event, it is willing to supply verification by Arthur Young & Company.
I find that the Union is entitled to have Barbizon submit to
it for examination

the records it demanded.

This includes the

chart of accounts, the general ledger, bank records, including
cancelled checks, and invoices and back-up.
TIMELINESS OF THE UNION'S CLAIM
Barbizon's claim that (1) the doctrine of laches should bar
the Union's claims and (2) the six months statute of limitations
in NLRA §10(b) bars the claim.

To the extent Barbizon's position

is that the claim with respect to the Albonito plant was not timely asserted, there is no need to address it in view of my disposition with respect to that plant.
LACHES
Both parties recognize that laches involves (1) inexcusable
delay or lack of diligence on the part of a claimant and (2) injury to the other party from the delay.

The record shows ongoing

discussions, negotiations and ample notice that the Union was
asserting a claim.

The failure to immediately file a grievance

under the circumstances is understandable (even desirable under
the contract) and not due to a lack of diligence.

In any event,

evidence of injury to Barbizon due to the passage of time is totally
lacking.

Without this critical element, the laches claim must
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fail under the circumstance of this case.
SECTION 10(b)

—

SIX MONTHS STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Barbizon's reliance on Del Costello v. Teamsters, 103 S. Ct.
2281 (1983) is misplaced on two grounds.

First, the Court re-

affirmed the teaching of Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S.
696, 86 S. Ct. 1107 (1966), that ordinary contract actions between
an employer and a union are governed by state statutes of limitations unless it involves a policy uniquely implicating basic
national labor policy such as a "hybrid §301/fair representation
claim."

In the latter event, §10(b) applies.

supra, at 2289-91.

This is not such a case.

Del Costello,
If brought as a

court action for breach of contract under §301, it would be an
action that "closely

resembles

an action for breach of contract

cognizable at common law."

Del Costello, at 2289, quoting Auto

Workers v. Hoosier, supra.

Therefore, even if Del Costello does

apply to arbitration proceedings, I find it does not require the
application of §10(b) to this proceeding.
Second, the power of the arbitrator in this case derives from
the agreement to arbitrate and the agreement governs when arbitration must be initiated.

Nothing in the agreement suggests that a

short six-months period was contemplated by the parties and nothing in the policy enunciated by Del Costello requires that the
arbitrator recognize a six-month period and I refuse to do so.
I hold that the Union's claims are not time-barred.
INTEREST ON THE AWARD
The Union first claimed interest on the award, if any, when
it filed its original brief.

It claims interest should be awarded

at the median prime rate (15.5%) for the period February, 1981,
through July, 1984, from the time each invoice was rendered by
the Union.

This would be interest on $190,356.22, from May 25,
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1982, on $20,778.01, from November 8, 1982, and on $158.05, from
June 27, 1983.

The Union would call into play the arbitrator's

power to grant "such other relief as the arbitrator may deem
proper."
Barbizon objects to the imposition of interest because the
Union raised it for the first time in its Brief and because it
is not customary and would be unusual to award interest.

For

those reasons and because it is not expressly provided for in
the contract, I agree, and deny the claim for interest on the
award.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

Barbizon Corporation violated paragraph
5 of Article XXX of the collective bargaining agreement and was not justified
in doing so under the provisions of paragraph 8 thereof; ,

2.

Barbizon Corporation did not violate any
agreement with ILGWU with respect to the
establishment and operation of a shop in
Albonito, Puerto Rico;

3.

The payment of a damage award to the Union
in compliance with the liquidated damage
clause would not violate section 302 LMRA
and is not a penalty and consequently such
payment would be lawful;

4.

Barbizon violated the provisions of Article
XXVII by its refusal to submit the books,
records and data requested by the Union.
Barbizon shall submit to the Union
examination its chart of accounts,
eral ledger, invoices and back-up,
cords, including cancelled checks,
iously demanded by the Union.

for its
the genbank reas prev-

The Union's right to demand liquidated damages on account of Barbizon's use of outside
contractors which may be discovered from the
examination of Barbizon's books, records and
data, is preserved.
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5.

The Union's claims are not barred by
§10(b), NLRA, or by laches;

6.

As damages, Barbizon shall pay to the
Union the sum of $211,292.28;

7.

The Union's demand for interest on
$211,292.08 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 16, 1985
STATE OF New York )ss :
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc.

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #52114 - 0073-84

and
City of Cincinnati

This matter was brought to arbitration pursuant to the
following agreement entered into by the above named Company
and City and signed June 22 and June 28, 1984.
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into by and between
the City of Cincinnati, a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Ohio, hereinafter called "City"
and Warner Amex Cable Communications of
Cincinnati, Inc., hereinafter called "Warner
Amex."

W I T N E B S E T H :
WHEREAS, the City and Warner Amex are parties
to a franchise ordinance and agreement, passed
and entered into respectively on February 19,
1981, granting Warner Amex, a non-exclusive
franchise to own, operate and maintain a Cable
Antenna Television System (CATV) within the
City for a period of 15 years, subject to certain terms and conditions; and
WHEREAS, among the terms and conditions contained in those documents are provisions which grant
Council of the City the authority to set rates
for certain cable services; and
WHEREAS, the authority of Council of the City
to set certain rates was challenged by WarnerAmex on the basis of a recent Federal Communication Commission (FCC) ruling (CSR-2269) FCC
released 83-525 released November 15, 1983; and
WHEREAS, the City maintained its authority to
so regulate rates remained unaffected by said
ruling; and
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WHEREAS, many of the suburban communities in
Hamilton County, having granted similar franchises to Warner Amex (either known as Warner
Amex Cable Communications Company of Greater
Cincinnati, Warner Amex Cable Communications,
Inc., or Warner Amex Cable Communications Company) shared in the dispute over rate-setting
authority based upon the terms of their various
franchises; and
WHEREAS, after protracted negotiations, it was
agreed between Warner Amex and the City, that
if substantial participation of other suburban
franchisees could be secured, a binding arbitration proceeding could be agreed upon; and
WHEREAS, a substantial number of cities, villages and townships having franchises with
Warner Amex have agreed to join in said binding arbitration; and
WHEREAS, Council of the City of Cinnati, by
Ordinance No 0 166-1984, has authorized the City
Manager to enter into an agreement with Warner
Amex Cable Communications of Cincinnati, Inc.
providing for the temporary suspension of certain rate provisions of the agreement and franchise between the City of Cincinnati and Warner
Amex based upon substantial compliance with
conditions for a last best offer binding arbitration procedure; now, therefore,
BE IT AGREED by and between the City and Warner
Amex, as follows:
1. Parties agree to submit rates for Expanded
and QUBE service to "last offer" arbitration
(by a panel of three (3) arbitrators) for the
year April 1, 1984 to March 31, 1985. Parties
agree also to submit to last offer arbitration
the rate for economy level service as well for
the year April 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986, if
rate relief is requested by the Company.
2. Rate increases proposed by Warner Amex to
go into effect April 1, 1984 (and April I, 1985
if requested by Warner in accordance with the
provisions hereof), i.e., while arbitration process is pending. Warner shall escrow in interest bearing account and refund with interest the
difference, if any, between rates implemented

-3April 1, 1984 and rates determined by the
Arbitrators.
3. Arbitrators' decision shall be based
upon such data, criteria, information (oral
or written) and documents as the arbitrators
reasonably deem appropriate. The arbitrators'
test is whether the Franchisor's or company's
last offer is better calculated to enable the
Company to earn a fair return on its investment.
4. Arbitrators' decision applies to Warner
Amex and a substantial number of all Warner
Amex franchise communities in Hamilton County,
Ohio. This number is currently estimated at
26 communities, but the failure of one or more
communities to adhere to the arbitration process shall not affect the binding nature of
this agreement upon the City of Cincinnati and
Warner Amex.
5. Arbitrators' decision will be effective for
one year, i.e., from April 1, 1984 to March 31,
1985 and, assuming a new arbitration is requested by the Company in 1985, from April 1, 1985
through March 31, 1986.
6. Parties expect that all open franchise issues
can be resolved mutually and they agree to make
good faith efforts to resolve all such issues,
outside of formal process, during the next 24
months.
7. Company shall provide Franchisors such data,
information (oral or written) and documents as
are reasonably necessary to submit a last offer.
In the event of any dispute, this issue shall be
resolved by the arbitrators.
8.

Arbitration Procedure:
1984

(i) April 13, 1984 -- designation of company and
Franchisors' arbitrators. Company provides data
to Franchisors.
(ii) April 20, 1984 -- designation of third arbitrator.

-4(iii) April 27, 1984 -- "last offers" submitted
to arbitrators. (Warner Amex last offer to be
$11,95 and $13.95).
(iv) May 4, 1984 -- oral presentations and/or
memoranda to arbitration panel.
(v) May 14, 1984 -- arbitrators select either
company or Franchisors' last offer.
1985
(vi) January 31, 1985 -- announcement of intent
to seek new rates (if rate change is sought).
(vii) February 15, 1985 -- Company provides
data to Franchisors.
(viii) March 1, 1985 -- designation of arbitrators.
(xi) March 8, 1985 -- designation of third arbitrator.
(x) March 15, 1985 -- last offer submitted.
(xi) March 22, 1985 -- oral presentations,
(xii) March 29, 1985 -- arbitrators' decision.
9. Arbitration process is experimental; participation by Warner Amex and Franchisors is without prejudice to their respective legal positions
regarding Federal preemption, rate setting authority, etc. From and after May 1, 1986, parties may
proceed in accordance with applicable laws. It is
expressly understood that this agreement does not
change any terms of the franchise agreements other
than those terms temporarily suspended as expressly
contained herein.
10. Parties to bear cost of their respective arbitrators and to share cost of third arbitrator and
arbitration expenses.
11. Either Franchisors or Company may elect not
to participate in arbitration for the one year
period commencing April 1, 1985 in the event there
is a change in the current status of the law relating to rates (i.e., Congressional enactment, FCC
regulations, or court decision binding on the parties
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12. Parties acknowledge that the dates set
forth in section 8, above have changed by
agreement of the parties.
The parties mutually agreed to a different time schedule
than that set forth in Section 8 above.

The Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of the Board
of Arbitration, and Richard M. Berman, Esq. and Nicholas P.
Miller, Esq. served respectively as the Company's and City's
designees on the Board of Arbitration.

The Oath of the Arbi-

trators' was waived.

Following a preliminary meeting, formal hearings were
held on September 6, September 18 and October 20, 1984.

Repre-

sentatives of the City and the Company appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken0

At the conclusion of the hearings, the Board of Arbitration met
in executive session.

The issue for determination is specific.

It is "whether

the Franchisors' or Company's last offer is better calculated
to enable the Company to earn a fair return on its investment."
Section #5 above sets forth the effective period for the Arbitrator's decision.
In question are the rates for Expanded Service and Qube
Service.

The Franchisors' (City's) last offer is $9.25 a month

for the Expanded Service and $11.25 a month for the Qube Service.

-6The Company's last offer is $11.95 a month for the Expanded
Service and $13.95 a month for the Qube Service.

(The present

Economy Service rate of $3.95 is not in dispute and is not involved in this arbitration.)

Ir should be noted that the stipulated issue and the agreement to arbitrate require the arbitrators to select either the
rates requested by the Company or those proposed by the City as
aforementioned, on a "last offer" basis.

We are not permitted

to fashion a different rate structure even if we concluded that
rates in excess of the City's proposal but less than those requested by the Company would be "better calculated to enable
the Company to earn a fair return on its investment."

Rather

we must decide which of the two "last offers" is "better

calcu-

lated" to achieve that result.
Also, we think it important to note that we are not asked
nor authorized to consider or decide such matters as what may be
in the public interest, or the consumer's ability to pay, or
the quality of the service provided, or the effect on the economy
by a rate increase, or the "value" of the instant services as
compared to similar services in other communities, or the impact
of cable TV as a monopoly or as a regulated industry.

Also,

assuming the veracity of the original projected costs, it is
irrelevant to the issue before us that actual costs proved to be
considerably higher than what the Company and the City expected
at the time the franchise was awarded.

-7However, we do think that the Company's efficiency in
operating the system is relevant to the rates that should be
charged, and therefore evidence of inefficiency must and will
be considered in deciding which set of rates is more appropriate.

In short, we view our authority as confined to deciding
which of the last offered rates better meet the test stipulated
considering the present and future state of the system and its
present and prospective operation.

The Time Horizon
The City's presentation is essentially that the optimism
of a few years ago as to utilization, costs and profitability
of CATV should not be abandoned,,

(9/18/84 Tr. 94-97).

The crux

of the Company's case is, that huge losses are piling up while
one waits to see whether profitability will come.

It certainly

has not come in the time frame that had been expected.

The urban-type cable TV industry is only a few years old,
so that projections as to such crucial elements as penetration,
the extent to which subscribers will accept various offerings,
price elasticity, advertising sales, the availability of attractive programs, and important components of operating expenses
are extraordinarily difficult to project, and degenerate to sheer
guesswork as the projected year becomes more distant.

Conse-

quently, unless some distortion can be shown, the major focus
should be on the five-year forecasts submitted by the Company,
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rather than on the fifteen-year forecast offered by the City.
It also follows that projections made at the time the franchise
was negotiated, in 1979 and 1980, are of only limited usefulness.

A major factor in the City's 15-year projection is the
present worth of the "value" of the system at the expiration of
of the 15-year franchise, computed as a multiple of the City's
forecast of the net operating income in the 15th year (See the
Tables in City Ex. 2, Sec. D).

Thus, in the City's calculations

the year in which operating results would have by far the greatest impact on the level of earned return, would be the fifteenth
year - the year whose results are most difficult to project.

This

defect is quite apart from the obvious circularity of having
the fairness of a return be derived from income levels which
will themselves depend on the return being allowed.

These difficulties with fifteen-year projections are
exacerbated by the uncertainties surrounding this industry.

It

has many competitors for the viewer's dollar, and the rate of
technological change is considerable.

(See Co.Ex. 5, Exhibit

B, P.2).

In argument, the City made the point that a five-year
horizon is too short, because the industry is generally financed
with tax shelters, and anticipates low returns in the first
seven years, and large cash flows in the later years. (9/6/84
Tr. 29)

But assuming this to be the case as to the industry

generally, it has not been shown to be the case

-9with respect to the Cincinnati system.

The Arthur Young 5-year

forecasts (Co.Ex. 6) were stated to be based on taking "full
tax benefits...in the year of occurence," and no objection has
been raised as to the calculation.

The Company's detailed cash

flow tables (at p.l of Response no. 1 to Question 1, 3/20/84
for the operation in the City, and the 5th unnumbered page of
response of 5/18/84 as to the suburbs) show that the tax benefit
have been flowed through.

The Company's method seems to have

been accepted by the City's consultants.

See City Ex. 2, p.c-10

Moreover, it must be appreciated that the rates set in
this proceeding are not being frozen for a fifteen-year period.
Apart from federal statutes on the subject, the Franchise

(Co.

Ex. 14) provides that "the City reserved the right to initiate
review of the regulated rates of the Company from and after the
time the Company achieves a fair rate of return on a cumulative.
basis" (Article III Sec. 4(b)).

See also Artc. Ill Sec. 4(e),

authorizing the City to review and monitor the Company's
financial calculations annually, to determine net investment
and cost of service.

Thus while a bonanza in the later years

would raise a question of inter-generational equity, it would
not lead to enrichment of the Company if the rates now set would
produce too high a level of earnings in the later years.

More-

over, the Arbitration Agreement explicitly provides that our
decision will be effective for only one year, ending March 31,
1985, or through March 31, 1986 if a new arbitration is requested
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by the Company. (Jt. Ex. 1, par. 5).

Furthermore, it could be argued in the later years that
the permissable rate of return should not contain as a component an allowance for deficiencies in the earlier years; that
would be retroactive rate-making.
Finally, it should be noted that when the Company (at the
City's request) extended its forecast to 1995, the results were
not significantly improved.

Net income (i.e., return on equity)

in the City and in the suburbs remained negative through 1992
and 1991 respectively, and for the full period 1980-1994 was a
negative 2 .6470 in the city and a negative 1.5% in the suburbs,
all based on the new rates.
As we accept the basic soundness of using a five-year
forecast, rather than one extending well into the 1990's that
will be our point of departure; and we shall then consider the
City's major comments on it.
The Company's Five-Year Projection
The basic evidence of the Company is five-year forecasts
of Arthur Young for each of the years 1984 through 1988, of
revenues, operating expenses, depreciation, interest cost, and
income tax benefits.

The assumption on which the forecasts are

based are the management's, but Arthur Young states that they
are "reasonable."

The forecasts, reflecting the Company's

proposed rates ( which have been put into effect subject to
refund) show a net loss in 1984 of $2,028,000 in the City and

-11$4,201,000 in the suburbs, and net losses over the five year
period of $10,743,000 in the City and $13,286,000 in the suburbs.

The Company's investment in the City is some $55 million,
and $107 million has been invested in the suburbs.

The Arthur

Young forecasts are based on a hypothetical financing pattern
of two-thirds debt and one-third common equity, and the interest
rate assumed on the debt is the actual cost to Warner-Amex,
which has been the lower of the prime rate and LIBOR (the London
Interbank Offering Rate) .

Presently that rate is 117o, substan-

tially below the levels in recent months for Moody's AAA
bonds.

and AA

These assumptions are conservative, and are not questionec

by the City.

The result is that one may assume equity investment

of one-third of the aggregate $262 million investment, or $54
million, against which, according to the Company's figures and
based on its new rates, there is a negative return of $6.2 million
in 1984.

The cumulative 1984-1988 loss of $24 million in the City

and suburbs combined cannot be set against the $162 million present investment, as considerable plant must be added in the intervening years, and adjustment must also be made for depreciation
and amortization, as well as for the effects of tax benefits „
The record shows that the average net investment in 1984-1988 is
forecast at $55,167,000 in the City and $80,981,000 in the
suburbs.
For the years 1984-1988 the Company's estimate is for a
positive cash flow of $10.6 million, and $26.0 million in the

-12suburbs, a total of $36.6 million.

This would reduce its cash

exposure from a combined $132.8 million at the end of 1983 to
$96.1 million at the end of 1988.

While this statistic may seem

to paint a rosier picture than the calculation of the return on
equity, its usefulness is limited by the fact that it includes
no element for the opportunity cost of money, i.e., for the foregone return on past negative cash balances.
The City's Critique of the Company's Figures
The City propounded a number of detailed interrogatories
to the Company, and expressed no dissatisfaction with the completeness of the responses.

The City has generally accepted the

accuracy of the Company's data (9/18/84, Tr. 62; 130) but has
questioned the soundness of a number of assumptions used in the
Company's forecast.

(a) The Magnitude of the Capital Investment
The record shows that the actual cost of construction
greatly exceeded the estimates at the time the franchise was
awarded. (9/18/84 Tr.p.12).

The record contains explanations

and reasons for the increase, but their acceptability is not in
issue here.

Our only concern is the adequacy of the return on

the investment.

The City's data are in a report by Rice Associates (City
Ex. 2).

The Rice Report, although accepting the historical capital

costs, rejects the Company's forecast for the future total cost
of drops, and of connectors and traps. (City Ex. 2, p. C-2 and
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Tables C-3 and C-4).
subscriber
ards."

Rice's reason is that "The cost per new

... is unreasonably high based on ... industry stand-

The Report does not state what the industry standards are

or how they were ascertained or where they can be found.

The

Company's estimates for the total costs of drops, connectors and
traps, as shown on Rice's tables C-3 and C-4, do indeed swing
widely; but the Company points out that the Report's tables divide
each year's capital costs for those items by the number of net
new subscribers, ignoring the new subscribers who are replacing
old ones, i.e., ignoring churn (9/18/84, Tr. 26, 184, 185) and
replacement (ibid. 169, 170).
Ex. 9, pp. 5,6).

The City does not deny this (City

The Company also points out that variability

in annual cost results from the replacement cycle, and from
purchases for inventory (ibid. 175-178).

On this record, we are not able to reject the Company's
estimates of the cost of additional facilities in the 1984-1988
period.

There is one remaining respect, on this record, in which
the plant constructed for the City and its suburbs might be said
to be under attack as imprudent: capacities were built into the
system which are not yet being utilized, and may never be utilizec
The system is 86 - channel, whereas only 60 are now serving.
However, there is indication in the record that the City wished
a state-of-the-art system; and the record contains no evidence as
to the incremental cost of the presently-unused capacity.

-14Moreover, our terms of reference confine us to consideration of
the return on the Company's "investment," and do not include any
question of whether the Company, in making its investment, has
over-built or gold plated.

Consequently we shall disregard this

possible factor.

(b) Home Office Expense
The Company's forecast is based on a charge to operations
in the City and the suburbs of 7% revenue, designed to pay for
technical support rendered by the home office to the local operation, including accounting, finance, engineering, operation,
programming, sales and marketing.

The Company claims that these

services are furnished to its entire operation (of more than 130
systems, 10/20/84 Tr. 102), and consequently that in the aggregate
they are cheaper than if each system arranged for those services
separately, an inference which is not self-evident.

The Company

says that the services are furnished at cost.

There are, of necessity, three questions: is the aggregate
of Home Office expense inflated, is the allocation of that aggregate to Cincinnati and its suburbs reasonable, and is there any
showing that the local burden could be arranged or purchased more
cheaply on a go-it-alone basis?

The record contains vigorous attacks on the product of the
first two factors, i.e., the magnitude of the dollar impact on
the local Company and on the suburban operation; and indeed the
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amounts are large when compared with the earlier estimates.

The

original pro forma estimate for the City's portion for 1984 was
$261,000, and it increased to $1,748,000 in the five-year forecast.

The City's consultant, Rice Associates, noting the very

large increase, simply reduces the estimated cost to the earlier
estimates.

This will not do.

For us to reduce the parent com-

pany's charge, it would be necessary for us to find either that
the gross Home Office cost to be allocated is excessive, or that
the allocation to the Company is unreasonable, or that the services
could be purchased at less cost elsewhere.

There can be little doubt that a holding company with
operating subsidiaries subject to rate regulation, has an
incentive to assign to those subsidiaries cost which, but for
regulation, might be borne by the parent.

The history of the

regulation of the telephone industry, and of the treatment of
service company subsidiaries of electric and gas utility holding
companies, is clear indication that the temptations are not always
resisted.

But that is no basis for a finding in this case, on

this record, that Warner-Amex has assigned to its operating
systems any costs which ought properly to be borne by itself.

As to the method of allocation, Rice Associates expresses
the view that a more direct method should be used, rather than
distribution of the costs as a function of revenues (City Ex. 2,
p. C-16).

Perhaps Rice Associates is correct; but its reasoning

is neither stated nor obvious.

The reasons for allocation of

-16such common costs on the basis of an easily calculated factor or
combination of factors, are the difficulty of ever finding "the
correct" method of allocating joint costs, the expense of attempt
ing to do so, and the quick obsolescence of the results of such
efforts.

However, there are relevant data in the record.

The Company

states (Co. Ex. 7, Request I, answer to Question 9) that the City
and its suburbs represented 7.6% of the parent's revenues, and
9.7% of its subscribers, while "absorbing" 6.3% of the "corporate
overhead" for its "field operations."

This is not entirely clear.

If it means that the Home Office Expense is the corporate overhead for field operations, this suggests that the parent has made
a detailed allocation study in which it has allocated the aggregate Home Office costs to the local systems on some basis which
seemed reasonable to it, and has found that the City and its
suburbs are actually responsible for only 603% of the aggregate.
If one wishes to convert this so that the allocation of Home Office
Expense would be a function of revenue, it would seem that one
must use the 6.3%.

This is 10%, less than the Company's 7% figure.

Accordingly we must ascertain the extent to which a 10%
decrease in Home Office expense would affect the estimate as to
costs in the 1984-1988 period.
estimated at $64,928.000.

The combined revenues in 1984 are

If Home Office expenses were charged

at 6.3% of revenue rather than 7%, the reduction of 0.7% would be
$454,496, before taxes.

An expense reduction of 0.7% of the

-17combined revenues in 1984-1988 would be $2,775,584.

There would,

of course, be a partial offset in the form of higher taxes.
As to the third question, whether the service could be
purchased elsewhere at lower cost, the record contains no evidence.
(c) Number of Potential^Customers
The Company asserts that the number of homes to which it
has been "able to gain access to provide service is 145,300."
(Co.Ex. 16, p.5).

Its figure is "based on actual count" (Co. Ex.

7, Request I, Answer to Question 2).

The City, however, has in-

formed Rice Associates that "a reasonable estimate of number of
homes would be 155,000" (City Ex. 2, p. C-10). We have been given
no basis for selecting the City's "reasonable estimate" in preference to the Company's actual experience.
be made.

However, no choice need

If the City's estimate is correct the only effect is

that the penetration levels (the percentage of potential customers
who actually accept service) would be reduced.

The City does not

suggest that the Company would deliberately reject potential
customers, and we see no reason why it would do so.
(d) Penetration Levels
Rice Associates states that at the time the franchise was
being negotiated, the estimated penetration ratios were based on
a marketing survey which forecast an overall penetration ratio
of 46% in 1984, increasing to 54% by 1990.

(City Ex. 2, p. C-ll)

In fact, however, the 1984 penetration ratio achieved by the

-18Company has been only 41.2%.

Rice Associates proposes that the

1985 forecast be based on 48%, increasing to 52% in 1988.
Ex. 2, Table D-8).

(City

The Company forecasts 45% in 1985, rising to

48.7% in 1988.* Rice Associates advances two reasons for its
view:
i - Rice says that the 1984 level is still reduced by the
economic recession through which we have passed.

The record shows penetrations in the City in the months
September 1983 through February 1984 ranging from 36.4% to 41.4%,
(Co. response to inquiries, 10/30/84, 1st page).

It must be notec

that penetration is generally somewhat higher in the winter months
(10/20/84 Tr. 53) and that the recession had itself receded by
about a year.

It appears that the Cincinnati market in terms of

penetration ratios, was not as good as had been anticipated, and
we are not entitled to attribute the shortfall to the earlier
recession.

(After February 1984, penetration ratios fell still

further, to 33.8% in September 1984, but those data are clouded
by the fact of the rate increase in April 1984„

Moreover, we

must observe that the City's last offer also provides a rate increase, which, assuming any price elasticity at all, implies a
lower penetration ratio than the ratio originally estimated, which
* Significantly higher penetration levels are assumed by the
Company for the suburbs, increasing from 53.8% in 1984 to 5570 in
1988.

(Co. Ex. 6, Notes to Forecast).

challenge these assumptions.

Rice Associates does not
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is the ratio Rice Associates would have us use.)

ii - Rice's second basis for rejecting the Company's lower
estimates of penetration, is the industry's experience.

It points

out that "the average penetration of the top 10 MSO's (including
Warner-Amex) and of the top 49 (is) approximately 59.4%," citing
Broadcasting, 6/4/84, p. 81 (City Ex. 2, p. C-ll).

The record

does not indicate whether the industry average (if that is what
"top 10" and "top 49" means) used by "Broadcasting" included
"classic" Cable TV (CATV) systems, which achieve a very high
penetration rate because they permit subscribers to receive television who, without cable, would not be able to receive it at all.
On the other hand, the Company responds with penetration levels
in ten municipal markets which range from 31.1 in Dallas to 40%
in Atlanta. (Co. Ex. 16, p. 5).

We have not been given adequate basis for upward revision
of the Company's assumptions as to penetration

rates.

(e) Additional Revenues
Cable TV has the potential of bringing to the subscriber's
television set any service which can be brought to the "head end"
(the central receiving and dispatching center) and then sent over
the cable.

Five years ago, when many cable TV franchises were

being negotiated, there was optimism that the systems would be
used for advertising, home security, home shopping, videotext,
and other services, and revenues from these uses were assumed.
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The Company states that "while the capacity for these kinds of
services was built into the Cincinnati system, no one has yet
discovered a way to make these ancillary services profitable."
(Co. Ex. 16, p. 7).

It does not follow, however, that the full risk should
rest on the shoulders of the consumers.

If we could calculate

the incremental cost of the facilities whose usefulness was
erroneously assumed, we could entertain an argument that the
investors should bear part or all of the burden of their construction, on the ground that that capacity renders no service.
It might be pointed out in reply, if the facts so warrant, that
the City, in negotiating the franchise, wanted that capacity
built into the system, so that the cost of the unused capacity
was really incurred at the behest of the customers.

We are again

mindful that our mandate is confined to the reasonableness of the
return on the Company's actual investment, not on some stripped
down hypothetical investment.

In any case, in the record before

us there are no data as to the incremental cost, and no exploration of the problem; we shall therefore not deal with it.

What we are left with is an argument by Rice Associates
on behalf of the City, that the Company's earnings projections
include no element for any of those uses.

One of those uses is

advertising.

i - The Company's detailed statements of revenue show,
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over the fifteen year period, 1981-1995 for the City "advertising
sales" aggregating $8,562,000 (Co. response to enquiries of
3/20/84, Response no. 1, p.8) and a corresponding figure of
$15,244,000 for the suburbs in 1980-1994 (Co. response of 5/18/84,
p.9), for a total of $23,806,000.

The revenue totals which appear

in the Arthur Young tables (Co.Ex. 6) in the years 1984-1988 are
the same totals as appear, in those years, in the 15 year forecasts we have just referred to.

Thus, the Arthur Young data in-

clude these advertising sales.

Rice Associates, for the years 1984-1988 for the City,
calculates a total of $3,042,000 of additional advertising revenue
(City Ex. 2, Table D-10A), beyond the Company's total for 19841988 of $2,819,000.

But we are given no basis, other than Rice

Associates' more sanguine expectations for the future, to reject
the Company's forecast; and that is not enough.

Moreover, there are costs associated with advertising revenue
Thus, for the first 8 months of 1984 the Company reported $515,000
of advertising revenue, and $351,000 of associated expenses (Co.
Ex. 16, p.8).

The record does not indicate the relationship be-

tween the marginal increment in advertising revenues estimated by
Rice Associates at $3,042,000 over the period 1985-1988, and the
marginal cost of obtaining and servicing the additional advertising; nor does the record show whether Rice Associates included,
in its calculations, any such off-setting costs.
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We are not warranted in adjusting the Company's forecast
of advertising income.
ii - Another "additional revenue" item is security
services.

In the full 15 year period, Rice Associates calculates

$16,192,000 of revenue from this source, of which $3,375,000 is
forecast for 1985-1988.

No revenue at all has been received from

this source, and Rice Associates forecasts only $36,000 for 1985.
The Company anticipates $7,596,000 for the period 1984-1994 (Co.
Ex. 7, Response to Question 5), but has not included any revenue
at all in its forecast for the period to 1994 because "it represents less than 170 of the forecasted revenue for 1984-1994." (ibid0)

This reason for ignoring the item is not compelling, since
a small effect on revenue may represent a large effect on the
rate of return.

The Company also points to the recurring losses thus far
in Warner-Amex's house security division, the biggest cable TV
operator in the security business in the country, (9/18/84, Tr.
23,24).

But this too is hardly a good basis for ignoring it

entirely at the local distribution level.

While we do not accept

the Rice Associates estimates, as they are not supported by anything other than hope and optimism, we think that the item should
not be ignored.

As a rough measure, we shall apply to Rice

Associates revenue estimate of $3,375,000 for 1985-1988 a factor
of 507o (approximately the ratio of the Company's aggregate for the
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15 year period to the City's corresponding figure), and conclude
that approximately $1,700,000 (before taxes) should be anticipated
for revenue from security services in the five-year period coverec
by the Arthur Young report (Co. Ex. 7).

This figure does not reflect any expenses for security
service.

While no data are in the record on that subject costs

must be taken into account in ascertaining whether a security
service makes a net positive contribution
Tr. 87).

(see Bowling 10/20/84

We shall return to this matter after considering whether

even the gross revenue figure, after taxes, combined with the
other adjustments we make to the Company's 1984-1988 forecast,
require a closer analysis.
iii - A third "additional revenue" item is the "institutional network." These are separate cables, to serve the special
needs of such institutions as schools, governments, universities
and commercial enterprises.

The Company states that it has in-

stalled two such loops in the suburbs at a combined capital cost
of $184,000 with annual operating costs of $49,000, and zero
revenues.

In the City it has made capital expenditures of

$621,000, and has projected an additional $622,000.

Rice

Associates points out that the franchise forbids subsidization
of the "1-NET" service by the regular commercial subscribers (Art.
II Sec. D subsec. 1, 5th para.), but the Company claims that since
it cannot find users who are willing to pay for the service, it
has delayed completion of the network despite "threatening

-24protests from the City."

(Co. Ex. 16, p.8).

Rice Associates correctly states that if the cost of constructing the network is included in the "rate base," but the
revenues are excluded, the forbidden subsidization would occur
(City Ex. 2,p.C-13).

But it suggests no specific remedy, as the

data are inadequate.

We believe the amounts involved are too

small to be a factor in our decision.

iv - A fourth "additional revenue" is Qube II programs,
for which Rice Associates contends there should be an adjustment
because the system has the purpose and capability of providing
the services.

Rice concedes that no revenues have yet material-

ized, but argues that "the brightening industry outlook suggests
that these capabilities will likely be utilized" (City Ex. 2, p.
C-12).

The Company's response is that these projections as to
ancillary uses of Cable TV have proven, across the country, to
be "pie in the sky".

It points to the absence of additional

options to offer its customers and the collapse in recent years
of a number of options which had been available, including the
Entertainment Channel, Satellite News Channel, CBS Cable, Escapade
Alternate View Network, Eros, American Network, and Spotlight as
well as the failure of videotext, home shopping and data transmission to develop viable businesses.

(Co. Ex0 5, Exhibit B.)*
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If rates were now being set for all time, we might be constrained to explore further the possibilities that these or other
ancillary services may in time become sources of revenue.

But as

of the present time, on this record, we cannot make an upward
adjustment for that possibility, in the period 1984-1988.
We note that even with the adjustments we are making and
even at the new rates, the Company will be earning less than a
reasonable return; thus it will have every incentive to develop
these possible additional sources of revenue.

If so developed,

the resultant net gain can be taken into account in future considerations of the adequacy of the return.
(f) Cost of Technical Operations
Rice Associates points out that the Company's expected expense for technical operations in 1984 is an increase of 234%
over the 1983 level.

(City Ex. 2, p. C-17).

The corresponding

figure for the suburbs is 90% (Co. response of 5/18/84, 9th unnumbered page).

The Company in reply refers to the large number of repair

* Although it is not in the record, we note that on November 20,
1984 Time, Inc.'s Home Box Office pay-cable television unit laid
off 10% of its corporate staff.

The Wall Street Journal reported

that "it has had a sharp slowdown in subscribers to its two pay
television services, HBO and Cinemax, in the face of rising costs
and stiff competition from the video-cassette market."
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calls it makes, and the numerous installation calls, reconnects,
changes of service, and disconnects.

However the Company's reply

offers no explanation for the very large increases in 1984 over
1983.

On the other hand the City does not dispute the actual

1984 experience to date, or the 1984 work load.

We shall return

to this matter.

(g) Sales Expense and Churn
The Rice Associates report asserts that the Company's expectations as to the future cost of sales (and incidence of churn)
is excessive.

It says that these costs "should decline" (Ex. 2,

p. C-17); that "many industry analysts feel that better marketing
efforts can improve penetration;" and that there is "a trend toward shifting marketing emphasis from pay to basic services
(Broadcasting, June 11, 1984)."

The report says that "The Com-

pany's lower penetration and high percentage of premium services
suggest that a revised marketing strategy and improved marketing
techniques may result in improved penetration and less need for
the current and future rate increases." (Ibid, p. E-ll).

The Company's response is that the cost of sales and resales
rises as a system matures because potential customers have already
rejected the service, and that retention marketing is necessary
to reduce churn.

(Co. Ex. 16, pp.11,12).

On this record we are unable to conclude that the Company's
forecasts of its sales expense in 1984-1988 are excessive, nor
absent expert marketing evidence subject to detailed gross exam-
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ination are we able to determine that the Company's marketing
methods are wrong.

(h) Operating Ratios; Over-all Operating Expenses
The Rice Associates report says that the over-all operating
expenses of the Company are high when compared with industry
averages (City Ex. 2, pp. 17,18).

The Company's response is to

cite high operating ratios in other cities (10/20/84, Tr. 31-34).
This evidence on both sides is of little use to us.

We are told

nothing about wage rates, local economic conditions, competitive
conditions, make ready costs, prevalence of underground vs.
overhead construction, varying franchise conditions and easement
availability, and the many other variables which can affect a
comparison of operating costs in Cincinnati and its suburbs with
those of other municipal areas.

We are unwilling to assume that

conditions are equal when their variability is so probable.

Conclusion as to the Company's Figures
The Company's five-year forecast shows net losses (i.e. a
deficiency below a zero return on its equity) of $10,743,000 in
the City and $13,286,000 in the suburbs, a total of $24,039,000.
We have concluded that the forecasts should be adjusted to reflect the following changes:
(a) Home Office Expense: a reduction of $2,775,584
in expense, before taxes.
(b) Security services: an increase of $1,700,000 in
revenue, before considering off-setting expenses,
and before taxes.
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We have also considered the City's attack on the increase
in the Company's "Technical Operations" costs over the 1983 level.
The actual 1983 level, in City and suburbs combined, was
$3,586,000.

The forecasts for the period 1984-1988 aggregate

$39,890,000 (Co. Ex. 16, Response No. 1, p.5; Co. Response of
5/18/84 9th unnumbered page).

If the 1984-1988 Technical Opera-

tions expense was reduced to the 1983 level, making no allowance
whatever for any increases in cost, the reduction in expense would
be $21,960,000 over the five year period.

This does not take in-

to account the increase in taxes which would result.

Thus, it appears that against the red $24,039,000 1984-1988
results in the Company's forecasts, there is a maximum of
$25,935,000 which could be applied ($2,775,584 in Home Office
expenses; $1,700,000 for Security Services revenue; and $21,960,000
of Technical Operations expense).

The income tax effect, alone,

would reduce this figure by nearly half, so that it is plain that
the adjusted five-year forecasts (even on the unrealistic assumption we have made as to Technical Operations costs) still show
that the Company will earn nothing at all on its equity in the
five-year period.

It is therefore not necessary for us to consider what level
of return on the equity would be reasonable, since the Company's
return is less than zero (although we point out that in determining
what rate of return is reasonable, we would not be bound by either
the 1870 rate of return on equity used by the Company in its
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original presentation to the City, nor by the 21% rate which,
as the City puts it, the Company now "postulates" (9/18/84,
Tr. 102).

(The cost of common equity capital changes over

time) .

We conclude therefore, that the Company's last offer
(the rates now in effect), comes closer to affording the
Company "a fair return on its investment" than does the City's
last offer.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: January 9, 1985

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. GS-83-E-14

Overseas Education Association
and
Department of Defense Dependents Schools

In accordance with Article 13, Section 10 of the collective
bargaining agreement in effect between the parties, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the
following stipulated issues:
1.

Is the grievance of Mary L. Soupios
arbitrable?

2.

If so, did management violate the
contract by denying the grievant's
request for two days personal leave?
If so, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held in the elementary school at Barton
Barracks in Ansbach, West Germany on January 16, 1985 at which
time representatives of the Union and Employer appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
hearing.

The grievant attended the

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

record was taken.

A stenographic

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.
BACKGROUND

The grievant, Mary Soupios, is a teacher at Ansbach Elementary School.
15, 1982.

Her mother died in the United States on November

The grievant did not then return for the funeral or

seek a leave to do so, but returned to the United Stated on
December 11, 1982 to assist her family in handling her mother's
estate.
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The Principal, Paul Seifert, granted the grievant three
days any-purpose leave and two days leave without pay.
grievant sought two days

The

personal leave (also referred to as

emergency leave) instead of the leave without pay.

The grie-

vant filed a grievance concerning this matter on January 13, 1983.
Issue 1:

Arbitrability

Contentions of the Employer
The Employer asserts that the grievance is not procedurally
arbitrable

because the Union failed to file the grievance "with-

in ten (10) calendar days after the act or specific incident
giving rise to the grievance" within the meaning of Article 13,
Section 3 of the collective bargaining agreement.

It is the view

of the Employer that the "incident" occurred when the Principal
indicated he would approve the two days without pay rather than
the two days personal leave.

As a result, the Employer insists

that the grievant had ten calendar days from that date within
which to file a grievance.

Having failed to do so and having

failed to obtain an extension, the Employer maintains that the
grievance is untimely.
Contentions of the Union
The Union argues that the grievance is timely because the
Principal requested, in a letter dated 15 December 1982, that
the Personnel Officer in the Regional Office "review the case
and indicate
applied."

the appropriate type of leave that should be

As the Acting Personnel Director, A. F. Frost, respond-

ed in a letter dated December 22, 1982 and the grievant did not
receive a copy of that letter until January 3, 1983, the Union
position is that the grievant filed the grievance in a timely
manner by submitting it within ten calendar days of January 3,
1983, namely, on January 13, 1983.
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Opinion
It is my judgment that the grievance is procedurally arbitrable.

The first written document that the grievant obtained from

a management representative authoritatively denying her request
for two days personal leave reached her on January 3, 1983.

Al-

though a written decision may not be mandatory, the willingness
of the Principal to contact the Personnel Officer to request
review of whether "there may be other cases which have created
a precedent for granting leave" in similar situations is sufficiently ambiguous with respect to the Principal's intention and
sufficiently lacking in finality to lull the grievant into believing that the issue still remained open.

The case involving

Marguerite C. Madden, relied upon by the Employer, is distinguishable because it involved a dispute concerning the payment
of a salary.

In that case the decision of the Employer could

be identified unmistakably
statement.

through an analysis of the payroll

In contract, the circumstances involving the grie-

vance of Ms. Soupios did not include a formal written document
or unquestionably reach the point of finality until the letter
the grievant received on January 3, 1983.

In addition, the in-

conclusive wording of the Principal's letter makes the instant
case different from the Madden case.

The Employer bears the

burden of proving that the grievance is not arbitrable by a
preponderance of the credible evidence.

It has failed to do so

and therefore the instant grievance is timely within the meaning
of Article 13.
Issue 2:

The Merits

Contentions of the Union
The Union insists that Article 19, Section 1 of the agreement entitles the grievant to two days of leave in the present

-4case.

In particular, the Union relies upon the following lan-

guage:

"Teacher leave may be used for . . . any personal

emergency."
In support of its position, the Union cites various government regulations, directives and procedures.

The Union under-

scores the critical importance of the grievant's return to the
United States in December of 1982 to administer her mother's
estate, to marshall family assets, and to deal with other members
of the family, all matters more demanding of the grievant's
presence and assistance than her presence at the funeral when
there was "nothing she could do."

Finally, the Union suggests

that the Principal denied the grievant's request out of personal
animosity.
Contentions of the Employer
The Employer asserts that the applicable contract language
and supporting documents do not authorize the grievant to receive either emergency leave, which would have required American
Red Cross involvement, or Teacher Leave under the "emergency"
category, which would have required a personal emergency of an
urgent nature.

The Employer claims the use of such leave to

settle her mother's estate was not within the meaning of the
contractual term "emergency."
Opinion
The issue is a narrow one.

It is whether the circumstances

surrounding the grievant's request for leave constituted an
"emergency."

The dictionary meaning of the word "emergency" is

"unforseeability and immediacy."

I see no reason why the word

"emergency" in this contract should not be given its customary
and usual meaning.

Handling her mother's estate and dealing with

the family may well have been complicated, requiring the grievant's

-5expertise and attention and of course it was a highly personal
and probably emotional undertaking.

But at that point it no

longer involved the immediacy, unforseeability or compulsion
of an emergency.

Whereas the funeral must be held on compelling

and short notice and cannot be scheduled at an accommodating time
the requirements in processing an estate are predictable and
controllable as a matter of timing, albeit still with personal
content.

For these reasons it is my conclusion that despite

the grievant's judgment on when her presence was more important,
a judgment I respect, it was not a period of time that constituted
a "personal emergency" within the contractual and customary meaning of that phrase.

Accordingly, the Employer did not violate

the collective bargaining agreement by refusing the grievant's
request for the leave.

Furthermore, there is no probative

evidence to prove that the Principal denied the grievant's request for any reason other than a dispute regarding the meaning
of the relevant 1 contract language and related documents.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having heard the proofs and allegations of the
above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

The grievance of Mary Soupios is
arbitrable.

2.

Management did not violate the
contract by denying the grievant's
request for two days personal leave.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 7, 1985
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STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

>-

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION AND AWARD
and
DuArt Film Laboratories
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract in assigning positive work to negative developers rather
than calling in positive developers to perform
such work? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 23, 1985 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
concerned were afforded full opportunity

All

to offer evidence and

argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
It is the Union's claim that unless positive developers
refuse to accept positive developing work on overtime or call-in,
the Company may not involuntarily assign positive developing to
negative developers.
Though the Union introduced evidence of a past practice
supportive of its position, the actual contract language and
arbitral contract interpretation sustain_- the Company's action.
Section 13 of the contract expressly provides for temporary
transfers between different classifications.

I am satisfied that

the assignments involved in this case, which took place on four
or five days in April were of a duration and quantity to constitute
temporary transfers within the meaning of Section 13.

Though a

positive developer had been laid off sometime prior to the
disputed assignments, I cannot conclude from the record that these
particular assignments "deprive(d) another employee of actual
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employment or full employment
13(a).

within the meaning of Section

Indeed, insufficient probative evidence was offered by

the Union on this last point.

However, the Company is cautioned

that it would be improper to lay off employees in anticipation
of covering the fulltime work vacated by the lay off, by temporary
transfers.

I would consider that violative of the final pro-

vision of Section 13(a).

But a proximate causation between the

earlier layoff of a positive developer in this case and the
subsequent assignment of negative developers to positive work
over the few days involved, has not been shoxvn.
Moreover, this issue had been considered and decided by a
prior industry arbitrator.

Arbitrator McMahon, in his Award

of October 4, 1966 in the matter of the arbitration between
Mecca Film Laboratories and Local 702 I.A.T.S.E., interpreted
Section 13 of the contract, and held that:
"The Company has the right under Article 13
of the collective bargaining agreement, to
require negative developers to do positive
developing and positive developers to do
negative developing."
The Article 13 referred to by Arbitrator McMahon is the same
as presently found in the contract between the parties to this
arbitration.

Since the McMahon Award, not only has there been

no change in Article (Section 13) but the effect of the McMahon
decision has not been nullified or changed by the several industry
wide contract negotiations that have taken place since then.

As

now, the contract between the Union and Mecca was the industry
wide contract; hence the industry arbitrator's interpretation
and decision is applicable industry-wide.

I subscribe to the

well settled rule that prior arbitration decisions covering the
same issue or substantive dispute should not be lightly reversed
or set aside by a subsequent arbitrator.

Obviously, I do not find

that Arbitrator McMahon was "palpably wrong."
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With the contract language clear and unambiguously interpreted by a prior arbitration decision, any practice to the contrary is immaterial as precedent for this case.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the contract in
assigning positive work to negative developers rather than calling in positive developers to perform such work.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: June 19, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.
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